Cooperation for a Peaceful and Sustainable World Part 2: Volume 20 Part 2

China's defense industry is analyzed by comparing the technical level of the military and civilian products manufactured by China's nuclear, space, aviation, shipbuilding, ordnance, and electronics industries with their advanced counterparts. Generally, China's defense industry is about 20 years behind the global leaders. Thus, it is inappropriate to declare China's emergence as the world’s second military power. However, if it continues on its current development trajectory, it will attain that status in the near future.

This chapter empirically examines the relationship between defense expending, budget deficits, and income redistribution in India for the period 1970–2009. The analysis is based on an autoregressive distributed lag model (ARDL) popularized by Pesaran and Shin (1999). Empirical estimates reveal that military spending in India is indeed associated with income redistribution. The empirical approach indicates that there exists a long-run relationship between transfer payments as a percentage in GDP (TP), defense expenditures as a percentage in GDP (ME), and budget deficits as a percentage in GDP (DEF) in India. Defense expenditures as a percentage in GDP and the budget deficits as a percentage in GDP have positive and significant impacts on transfer payments in the same fiscal year. But the budget deficit as a percentage in GDP has a negative and significant impact on transfer payments as a percentage in GDP in the next fiscal year.

This chapter develops a growth model of a country under a Hobbesian environment with international conflicts in which national defense is the only way to prevent external predation. The long run growth path is determined by the equilibrium of a dynamic game with three players: the external predator, the government, and the family. The equilibrium growth path has three phases: submissive equilibrium, tolerant equilibrium, and full-protected equilibrium. Different defense strategies result in different growth prospects, and sustainable growth will endogenously induce adjustment of defense strategies.

In general, the security situation for China’s sports pageants is quite stable, but still China needs to face up to the threats from both traditional and nontraditional security areas such as terrorism, separatism, and extremism. Terrorism is the biggest threat to China’s sports pageants. Effective security and defense strategies for the games require reliable intelligence. Reliable intelligence, however, is notoriously difficult to obtain even though we are immersed in vast quantities of information. How can we identify and obtain the useful intelligence from the vast sea of other less useful information? After analyzing the potential terrorism attacks and terrorists in the 2008 Beijing Olympic Games and the 2010 Guangzhou Asian Games, this chapter analyzes the potential means for counterterrorism at the games and tries to set up an intelligence study system based on the Information Galaxy (IG), which includes five parts of Sun (S), Earth (E), Moon (M), Information Sharing Environment (ISE), and IG. The relationships of SEM are just like the Sun, the Earth, and the Moon. All the methods especially need to cooperate in the study of different cases in the IG system until valuable intelligence can be produced from the S, the S-E, the S-E-M, or the S-E-Ms. This chapter does not expect to put forward a complete and careful theoretical system of terrorism and Intelligence-led counterterrorism in China, but it still tries to establish a relatively complete theoretical framework, with a multi-disciplinary perspective of peace science, national defense economics, information science, and computer science, etc.

China–Africa relations have come under scrutiny recently, with more articles and books having been written on it in the last 10 years than in the preceding 50 years all put together. Despite the generous attention, however, the nature and outcome of China–Africa relations are far from clear. It is, in fact, as though the more one reads about China in Africa, the less one knows about it. The empirical evidence seems to lend support to the twin claims that China is looting Africa and that it is developing the continent. The massive literature and seemingly contradictory perspectives about Africa–China relations thus cry out for a disciplinary framework, disciplinary in both senses of that term. What are the divergent perspectives about Afro–Chinese relations? How did they emerge? What are the driving forces behind them? Is the sustained discourse about Afro–Chinese relations justifiable on empirical grounds? And is it a good thing for Africa in any case? These questions are addressed in this essay from the perspective of social constructivism.

The chapter provides a theory of war and conflict issues, and applies the theory to the arms race and the possibility of war in the South Asian subcontinent. We try to give a new perspective on an old question: wars are not rational since they destroy the contestable resource over which disputes arise; yet, states that are rational frequently undertake them rather than going for the less costly option of settlement. In the chapter, a war game is played in which two states first build armaments and then, if they cannot achieve a settlement, fight a war, the outcome of which depends on strength of armaments, where at stake is a contestable resource. The anticipated outcome determines the bargaining threat point. “Technology” is a factor in any war, and so too is the cost of building armaments. States typically differ in technology and may also miscalculate their own relative technical position and war-fighting capability. Alternative models of settlement and war are presented in which states either believe the opposing state has the same perception of technical advantage, or else know the opposing state’s differing perception. Dynamic models, which include the effects of decay in information over time and strategic concerns, are examined. Finally, the results of the models are applied to the stylized facts of India-Pakistan rivalry and conflict, paying particular attention to institutional issues. It is demonstrated that the stylized facts of the Indo-Pakistani conflict and wars fit well with the theoretical conjectures of the analytical models. External conflicts and wars in South Asia are often related to internal causes, which allow the possibility of incomplete information; the two contending states miscalculate their own power in terms of war-fighting capability, so that war occurs.

The recent recession has seen something of a resurgence in the debate over military Keynesianism. Recent commentators, who should know better, have claimed that it would make sense to stimulate the U.S. economy through increases in military spending, as though this has not been a commonly contested view over the last 40 years. A large, literature has debated the economic effects of military spending, and while it has reached no consensus, there is also little support for any belief that military spending is a good way of stimulating the economy. This paper makes a contribution to the debate by assessing the theoretical perspectives and the empirical approaches used. It then undertakes an analysis of the United States using a number of approaches, and the results suggest that the simple military Keynesian arguments still lack empirical support.

Post-conflict economies are characterized by high, and often growing, levels of debt. At the same time, peace is particularly fragile in the aftermath of a conflict. This chapter studies how debt affects the risk of war in the 10 years that follow the end of a previous conflict. After controlling for per-capita income and other economic, political, and geographical factors, external debt is found to increase the risk of war. Conversely, the effect of domestic debt is negligible. The policy implication for the international community is clear: debt relief helps stabilize peace in war-torn economies.

India became a NWS (Nuclear Weapons State) most reluctantly in May 1998 despite her demonstration of nuclear weapons capability 24 years earlier in May 1974. Having assumed the new status as the sixth overt nuclear weapons state, India also declared her principled policy governing use of nuclear weapons in the event of a national security threat. The Indian Nuclear Doctrine was called “minimum deterrence” by the BJP-led NDA government, but the Congress-led UPA government in 2004 renamed it as “credible deterrence.”

But the heart of the vibrant Indian nuclear doctrine is its commitment to No First Use (NFU) of nuclear weapons. Nuclear weapons were invented by the United States (U.S.). First-ever use of atom bomb is also made by the Americans and a philosophic foundation for the discussion on NFU was also laid in the U.S. However, having put the NFU in the philosophic parlance, the U.S. in the Cold War International environment professed the doctrine for First Use (FU) of nuclear weapons. It is China that made a first public commitment to the NFU after it became the fifth nuclear weapons state.

This chapter proposes to discuss Indian commitment to NFU as a first step on the long path toward global nuclear disarmament—or No Use (NU) of nuclear weapons. India saw Partial Test Ban treaty of 1963 as a step toward NU and also saw the discussions on NPT as another step toward nuclear disarmament as much as it wanted the big powers to see the CTBT too as a device aimed at putting world into NU bind. West, led by the U.S., was however only interested in using the CTBT to deny nuclear weapons status to threshold states, particularly India.

As a self-declared nuclear weapons state, India has, in nuclear doctrine, committed itself to nuclear disarmament. Can there be an international treaty between the declared nuclear weapons states? Can India and Russia come together on the issue? Can they convince China to join? With three Asian nuclear weapons states committing themselves to NFU, U.S. can see economic sense in an international treaty on NFU. Is it possible to create a global public opinion in favor of NU of nuclear weapons? The questions will be answered based on research conduct on the subject.

This chapter presents a critique of the so-called peace process through military action within the Sri Lankan ethnic conflict. There is a need to study this problem from the psychological, developmental, and humanitarian point of view. This chapter analyses the deep-rooted seeds of the problem, its historical background, its various domestic and international angles and perceptions, and the international angles as well as regional implications of the Sri Lankan Tamil insurgency. The nature of the problem, the effect of ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka on regional security, and the militarily remedization of the problem by Sri Lankan government and its result are focused on here.

Finally, the study identifies the contemporary role of diaspora communities as a severe hindrance to a lasting peace in the country. Thus, the analysis concludes that lasting peace in the island is possible only through the promotion of a genuine liberal democracy, from both within and without. Suggestions for future peace, stability, and development have been put forward.

While internal wars have acquired a new lease of life in the post-Cold War era and the capacity of the states has become limited thanks to globalization, non-state actors are seen to play an increasingly important role in handling and mitigating them. The paper focuses on four such interventions in contemporary India ranging from (a) parties themselves striving hard for bringing the conflicts to an end and (b) “third party” acting as a mediator to (c) both armed and unarmed interventions of organized nature and (d) initiatives individuals take while trying to resolve them. Not all such interventions are necessarily civil society interventions for the latter aim not only at ending conflicts but ending them in a way that establishes the principles of rights, justice, and democracy.

In this study, we empirically investigate the effect of military expenditure on economic growth in the five South Asian countries of Bangladesh, India, Pakistan, Nepal, and Sri Lanka over the period of 1990–2006. By applying a Solow Growth Model, empirical evidences derived from panel estimation methods indicate that defense has a negative effect on economic growth in the region.

China has showed its eagerness in using its economic strength in the very recent years. Is China going to be a major sanctioning state like the United States or the European Union? This chapter argues that although there have been an increasing number of economic sanctions imposed by China with its expanding national interests and growing diplomatic problems, China will still keep a low profile in using economic sanctions because of the restraining factors such as the WTO rules, inherent problems in its economy, the pursuit of a good reputation and its strategy of peaceful development. Thus the frequency and tactics of using economic sanctions may vary according to its rising economy and changing international situation, but that will go in a very limited way.