Research on Professional Responsibility and Ethics in Accounting: Volume 25

Stuebs et al. (2021, p. 38) note that soft skills “are essential for accountants to carry out their moral agency role in society.” Indeed, calls for aspiring accounting professionals to have well-developed soft skills have been ongoing for decades (American Accounting Association [Bedford] Committee on Future Structure, Content, and Scope of Accounting Education, 1986; Accounting Education Change Commission, 1990; Albrecht & Sack, 2000; Big 8 White Paper, 1989; Lawson et al., 2014; Pathways Commission, 2012). Despite these calls, the development of accounting students’ soft skills remains elusive (Fogarty, 2019; Rebele & St. Pierre, 2019). Perhaps this is not surprising as a commonly accepted, profession-specific definition of the term is lacking, as is consensus about the corresponding capabilities comprising accounting professionals’ soft skills. Instead, those in the accounting profession have treated the term soft skills much the way Justice Potter Stewart famously described hard-core pornography: “I know it when I see it” (Jacobellis v. Ohio 1964, p. 197). The problem, of course, is that such a description is individualistic and can lead to conflicts and inconsistencies not only in identifying the phenomenon (Baskin, 2018; Goldberg, 2010) but, more importantly, particularly in the case of soft skills, in taking steps to foster its development and measuring changes in it. Thus, understanding the term soft skills and its fundamental capabilities is a necessary prerequisite to the development of the soft skills deemed critical for future accounting professionals. In this chapter, the authors advance that understanding by developing an accounting-specific definition for soft skills and identifying a set of capabilities that comprise soft skills applicable to accounting professionals. The authors also discuss the implications of the work and conclude by recommending soft skills in accounting be referred to as professional competencies.

Financial reporting decisions are influenced by environmental and individual factors. One environmental factor is the example set by management. Research has shown that the tone at the top is related to financial reporting decisions. However, this does not take into consideration that ethical cues from an employee's supervisor might also be relevant. On an individual basis, people who make unethical financial reporting decisions do not appear to be bad or evil people. So, why do these seemingly “good” people make these decisions? The theory of self-concept maintenance (Mazar et al., 2008) posits that individuals balance the desire to gain by behaving unethically with the desire to maintain a positive self-image by behaving ethically. How one balances these is based on one's ability to rationalize an action as honest, with decisions seen as having an ethical component being more difficult to rationalize. Findings indicate that having one person in a leadership position demonstrate a commitment to ethical behavior is related to more ethical financial reporting decisions, whether that person is at the top or closer to the middle. Additionally, a strong tone at the top is related to perceiving a situation is an ethical dilemma while a strong tune in the middle is not. Last, the authors find that a stronger perception that a situation is an ethical dilemma is associated with more ethical financial reporting decisions when the tune in the middle is controlled for, but not when the tone at the top is controlled for.

Some of the best information for preventing accounting violations is received from employees who have observed the unethical behavior (Henning, 2016). However, receiving information about accounting violations or other unethical behavior in organizations requires employees to voluntarily report the behavior. Employees may be particularly hesitant to report unethical behavior when the behavior benefits them. Employees may also justify their own unethical behavior as morally appropriate when their moral identity allows the behavior. The authors draw on psychology and ethics literature to examine the relationships among moral identity, moral disengagement, and unethical behavior. In the exploration of behavior, the authors examine both commissions and omissions. While unethical commissions are violations directly committed by an individual without cooperation from others, unethical omissions are violations resulting from an individual failing to take steps necessary to correct another's unethical behavior.

The authors conduct a survey about cheating with a sample of college students. Using structural equation modeling, the authors find that intentions to engage in unethical commissions are positively associated with moral disengagement, while unethical omissions do not appear to create the moral disengagement that can arise from cognitive dissonance. The authors also find a feedback loop from moral disengagement to future intentions, which suggests moral disengagement created from one unethical act increases intentions for future unethical behavior. Finally, the authors find a simple intervention that can help to increase the moral intensity of observed unethical behavior.

Understanding whistleblowing behavior by identifying preferred reporting channels and associated personality characteristics can aid organizations in their attempts to encourage whistleblowing. The authors investigate whether both Dark Triad characteristics and gender affect whistleblowing intentions and whistleblowing channel preferences. Using a sample of undergraduate business students, the authors find individuals with higher levels of Dark Triad personality characteristics indicate that they are less likely to blow the whistle than individuals with lower levels of Dark Triad personality characteristics. They are also more likely to use non-anonymous channels over anonymous channels and individuals with lower levels of Dark Triad personality characteristics show the opposite channel preference. The authors also find women more likely to report, and when reporting, they prefer anonymous over non-anonymous channels. The results provide support for organizations in cultivating an organizational culture that promotes communication among employees and potentially includes incentives to promote whistleblowing.

A long-time ethical issue in financial accounting is earnings management. Two popular ways that earnings are managed include use of accruals (Kothari et al., 2016) and real activities management (RM). This study examines the association between RM and short selling and an association between short sellers and RM behavior related to earnings management. Instead of using accruals, RM is accomplished by timing investment or financing decisions and thereby alter reported earnings. Our results show that short sellers avoid targeting firms with a high level of RM, but this only holds for those firms that just meet analysts’ forecasts. This result suggests that short sellers interpret RM as a signal used by companies to convey their “good news” and confidence in their future performance. On the other hand, the authors document that heavily shorted firms engage in a lower amount of RM, which is consistent with the notion that short selling plays an external disciplinary role in constraining firms’ RM behavior for earnings management. This chapter would be of interest to anyone concerned with earnings management, such as financial market analysts, investors, academic researchers, and, in particular, regulators, who are involved in setting rules on short selling.

The authors examine the relationship between credit default swaps (CDS) initiation and managers’ earnings forecast choices with different corporate governance structures. The authors expect that corporate governance plays a significant role in managers’ disclosure behavior as well as CDS initiation. The findings suggest that CDS initiation and managers’ earnings forecast behavior are positively associated. Firms with a strong monitoring mechanism issue a higher number of earnings forecasts and also issue forecasts more frequently when there is a traded CDS contract in the market. Additionally, the results suggest that managers issue more accurate earnings forecasts. Overall, these findings imply that the role of managers is important to mitigate the information asymmetry between individual and institutional investors when there is a new financial instrument because the development of the regulations and market rules for these instruments takes a longer time.

Casino gambling in the United States has increased significantly in the last 30 years, going from just 2 states (Nevada and New Jersey) in 1988 to 41 states with over 980 casinos. This rapid growth of casino gambling has resulted in additional social costs, including workplace embezzlements committed by problem gamblers. Embezzlements contribute to greater fraud risk for organizations in casino regions and are expected to rise as casinos multiply and increasingly cater to convenience gamblers. The purpose of this chapter is to highlight the proximity of casinos as a fraud risk factor for embezzlement. The authors recommend that internal and external auditors for companies located in casino areas assess this fraud risk and where appropriate, perform audit procedures to address this risk. There is also an opportunity for external auditors to assist those companies located in casino regions (that may lack internal auditors) in establishing fraud prevention programs.

EY's audit of German company Wirecard raises many questions about the quality of its audit. The scope and depth of the audit deficiencies have led some to call it: Germany's Enron. The authors review the facts of the case and raise broad-based questions that address EY's audit: what it did wrong, what other steps it might have taken to enhance the audit, and whether it can be characterized as a failed audit. The case provides learning objectives, implementation guidance, and answers to these questions. The authors believe that it can be used at both the undergraduate and graduate levels in courses dealing with accounting ethics, fraud in financial statements, and auditing.

Martin Winterkorn had high aspirations for Volkswagen to become the world's leading automaker when he was promoted to CEO in 2007. Volkswagen lacked the technology needed to meet American emissions standards and fulfill their promise of a “clean” fuel efficient diesel engine. Instead, they chose to deceive the world, violating the law and the foundation the company's code of conduct was grounded in. This case provides an opportunity to explore corporate governance, ethical leadership, and the ethical and professional responsibilities that senior executives have to create and maintain an ethical culture. Examination of the details in the case uncover value conflicts. Examples of values included in IMA's Statement of Ethical Professional Practice are honesty, fairness, objectivity, and responsibility. IMA describes these as “overarching ethical principles.”