Managerial Finance: Volume 31 Issue 7

Executive compensation contracts and voluntary disclosure to security analysts

Marilyn F. Johnson, Ram Natarajan

We hypothesize that a CEO’s responsiveness to security analysts’ demands for information about the firm is influenced by the structure of the CEO’s compensation package. Our…

On the valuation and incentive effects of executive cash bonus contracts

Lionel Martellini, Branko Urošević

Executive compensation packages are often valued in an inconsistent manner: while employee stock options (ESOs) are typically valued ex‐ante, i.e., before uncertain ties are…

Stock option plans in EuroStoxx 50 companies

Rutger Muurling, Thorsten Lehnert

Employee Stock Options are the most widely used incentive compensation tool, and prior research has shown their advantages. However, research among different peer groups…

Executive valuation of simple compensation packages: the interaction of risk aversion, leverage and volatility

Richard Heaney

This paper analyses the value to a poorly diversified risk‐averse executive of a compensation package consisting of a risk free asset, restricted stock and stock options. The…