CEO turnover and firm performance, evidence from Thailand

Parichart Rachpradit; John C.S. Tang; Do Ba Khang

doi:10.1108/14720701211214061

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Corporate Governance

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CEO turnover and firm performance, evidence from Thailand

Document Information:
Title:	CEO turnover and firm performance, evidence from Thailand
Author(s):	Parichart Rachpradit, (Lecturer at the Department of Business Management, Asian Institute of Technology, Pitsanuloke, Thailand), John C.S. Tang, (Based at the School of Management, Asian Institute of Technology, Pitsanuloke, Thailand), Do Ba Khang, (Based at the School of Management, Asian Institute of Technology, Pitsanuloke, Thailand)
Citation:	Parichart Rachpradit, John C.S. Tang, Do Ba Khang, (2012) "CEO turnover and firm performance, evidence from Thailand", Corporate Governance, Vol. 12 Iss: 2, pp.164 - 178
Keywords:	Boards of directors, Chief executives, Corporate governance, Corporate ownership, Ownership, Thailand
Article type:	Research paper
DOI:	10.1108/14720701211214061 (Permanent URL)
Publisher:	Emerald Group Publishing Limited
Acknowledgements:	Received: March 2010. Revised: March 2010. Accepted: June 2010.
Abstract:	Purpose – This paper seeks to examine the relationship between chief executive officer (CEO) turnover and firm performance and the moderating effects of ownership structure and board structure with respect to listed non-financial companies in Thailand. Design/methodology/approach – Logit model is employed to analyze the relationship between CEO turnover and firm performance. Findings – The paper finds that both ownership and board structure have effects on the relationship between CEO turnover and firm performance. The probability of CEO turnover is lower when the firm is controlled by family, the CEO is part of the controlling family, and board size is larger. Contrary to previous studies, sensitivity of CEO turnover to firm performance is higher with the presence of CEO duality and lower degree of board independence. When a CEO continues to work beyond retirement age, the probability of turnover is not associated with firm performance. Originality/value – This study provides evidence that CEO duality and low independent board is not necessarily bad corporate governance practice for Thai companies and would be of interest to regulatory bodies, practitioners, and academic researchers.