Emerald | Indian Growth and Development Review | Table of Contents http://www.emeraldinsight.com/1753-8254.htm Table of contents from the most recently published issue of Indian Growth and Development Review Journal en-gb Tue, 08 Apr 2014 00:00:00 +0100 2014 Emerald Group Publishing Limited editorial@emeraldinsight.com support@emeraldinsight.com 60 Emerald | Indian Growth and Development Review | Table of Contents http://www.emeraldinsight.com/common_assets/img/covers_journal/igdrcover.gif http://www.emeraldinsight.com/1753-8254.htm 120 157 Comparative corruption in China and India http://www.emeraldinsight.com/journals.htm?issn=1753-8254&volume=7&issue=1&articleid=17107551&show=abstract http://www.emeraldinsight.com/10.1108/IGDR-12-2013-0047 <strong>Abstract</strong><br /><br /><B>Purpose</B> – This paper aims to explore the difference in the extent and nature of corruption in China and India. <B>Design/methodology/approach</B> – The paper takes a comparative political-economy approach. <B>Findings</B> – The paper shows the complexities in the different style and substance of governance in the two countries that are not captured in the usual democracy-authoritarianism comparisons. <B>Originality/value</B> – The interesting contrasts highlight differences in style and content of governance in China and India, which are not captured in the usual facile democracy-authoritarianism comparisons. Article literatinetwork@emeraldinsight.com (Pranab K. Bardhan) Tue, 08 Apr 2014 00:00:00 +0100 Accountability of local and state governments in India: an overview of recent research http://www.emeraldinsight.com/journals.htm?issn=1753-8254&volume=7&issue=1&articleid=17107552&show=abstract http://www.emeraldinsight.com/10.1108/IGDR-12-2013-0049 <strong>Abstract</strong><br /><br /><B>Purpose</B> – This paper aims to provide an overview of recent research on accountability of local and state governments in India. <B>Design/methodology/approach</B> – The Downsian theory of electoral competition is used as a departure point for classifying different sources of government accountability failures. Subsequent sections deal with each of these sources in turn: limited voter participation and awareness; ideology, honesty and competence of political parties and electoral candidates; capture by elites; clientelism and vote-buying. Each section starts by explaining the relevant departure from the Downsian framework and then reviews available empirical evidence in the Indian context for each of these possible “distortions”, besides effects of related policy interventions. The final section summarizes the lessons learnt, and the fresh questions that they raise. <B>Findings</B> – The paper describes a range of possible reasons that limit the effectiveness of elections as a mechanism inducing governments to be accountable to their citizens and reviews the evidence available from the Indian context concerning each of these. <B>Originality/value</B> – The contribution of the paper is to provide an overview and perspective of recent literature on political economy problems affecting performance of state and local governments in India. Article literatinetwork@emeraldinsight.com (Dilip Mookherjee) Tue, 08 Apr 2014 00:00:00 +0100 Perceived corruption frequency and size of corruption in economies http://www.emeraldinsight.com/journals.htm?issn=1753-8254&volume=7&issue=1&articleid=17107553&show=abstract http://www.emeraldinsight.com/10.1108/IGDR-05-2012-0027 <strong>Abstract</strong><br /><br /><B>Purpose</B> – The paper aims to develop a theoretical model to explain the exact process through which the scale effect works to create a possible wedge between a perception-based ranking like the “Corruption Perception Index (CPI) ” and the axiomatic “absolute costs of corruption”-based ranking of economies with low enforcement against corruption. <B>Design/methodology/approach</B> – The paper takes into account corruption both at the “high” and “low” levels of bureaucracies, where the bribes are paid sequentially at the two levels. The bribes are endogenously determined at the equilibrium using a sequential game approach. <B>Findings</B> – The paper finds that in the absence of coalition between the two levels of bureaucrats, both the absolute level of corruption and the welfare level of the economies are expected to vary inversely with the perceived corruption frequency. The paper also explores the possibility of a stable coalition between the “high” and “low” level bureaucrats and shows that with the perception of a stable coalition being formed, the negative monotonic relation between the corruption frequency and the absolute size of corruption breaks down. <B>Originality/value</B> – First, the paper argues that the ranking of the economies with low enforcement against corruption on the basis of perceived corruption frequency may not reflect the ranking of the economies according to their absolute size of corruption; it points out that the perceived higher corruption frequency in an economy as reflected in CPI can be an indicator of both the lower size of “high” level corruption and absolute size of corruption in the economy. Particularly, this happens in economies where coalition between the “high” and “low” level officials does not form. Second, it identifies the exact way in which the scale effect works to create a difference in the CPI ranking and the axiomatic “absolute costs of corruption”-based ranking and explains why similar difference would exist if “absolute costs of corruption”-based ranking is derived from all the sources of hard data on corruption. Third, it explains why a stable coalition between the “high” and “low” level bureaucrats in economies with low enforcement does not usually form. Article literatinetwork@emeraldinsight.com (Vivekananda Mukherjee, Aparajita Roy) Tue, 08 Apr 2014 00:00:00 +0100 Bribery in subsidized credit markets: evidence from Bangladesh http://www.emeraldinsight.com/journals.htm?issn=1753-8254&volume=7&issue=1&articleid=17107554&show=abstract http://www.emeraldinsight.com/10.1108/IGDR-11-2011-0042 <strong>Abstract</strong><br /><br /><B>Purpose</B> – The aim of this paper is to study the role of bribery in subsidized credit markets in developing countries. First, the authors use the data to test whether more productive borrowers will pay larger or smaller bribes since the theoretical literature offers conflicting findings regarding the relationship between the size of the bribe and the productivity of borrowers. Second, the authors test whether being eligible to borrow from a microfinance institution affects the frequency or the magnitude of the bribe paid when borrowing from a (non-microfinance) subsidized bank. <B>Design/methodology/approach</B> – The empirical analysis is based on existing theoretical models of bribery. The data set uses publicly available survey data from the Bangladesh Institute for Development Studies. The primary linear model is estimated using OLS. Because left-censoring affects the data, the authors also estimate a Tobit model. Finally, to correct for potential selection bias, the authors also estimate a Heckman selection model. <B>Findings</B> – The authors find that more productive borrowers pay lower bribes than less productive borrowers and that being MFI-eligible affects the frequency of bribery, but not the magnitude of the bribe. <B>Originality/value</B> – To the authors' knowledge, the paper is the first empirical study of bribery in subsidized credit markets. Article literatinetwork@emeraldinsight.com (Emmanuel Dechenaux, Aaron Lowen, Andrew Samuel) Tue, 08 Apr 2014 00:00:00 +0100 Crime, corruption and the role of institutions http://www.emeraldinsight.com/journals.htm?issn=1753-8254&volume=7&issue=1&articleid=17107555&show=abstract http://www.emeraldinsight.com/10.1108/IGDR-11-2011-0040 <strong>Abstract</strong><br /><br /><B>Purpose</B> – There have been very few attempts in the economics literature to empirically study the link between criminal and corrupt behaviour due to lack of data sets on simultaneous information on both types of illegitimate activities. The paper aims to discuss these issues. <B>Design/methodology/approach</B> – The present study uses a large cross-country data set containing individual responses to questions on crime and corruption along with information on the respondents' characteristics. These micro-level data are supplemented by country-level macro and institutional indicators. A methodological contribution of this study is the estimation of an ordered probit model based on outcomes defined as combinations of crime and bribe victimisation. <B>Findings</B> – The authors find that: a crime victim is more likely to face bribe demands, males are more likely victims of corruption while females are of serious crime, older individuals and those living in the smaller towns are less exposed to crime and corruption, increasing levels of income and education increase the likelihood of crime and bribe victimisation to be reported and a stronger legal system and a happier society reduce both crime and corruption. However, the authors find no evidence of a strong and uniformly negative impact of either crime or corruption on a country's growth rate. <B>Originality/value</B> – This paper is, to the authors' knowledge, the first in the literature to explore the nexus between crime and corruption, their magnitudes, determinants and their effects on growth rates. Article literatinetwork@emeraldinsight.com (Ishita Chatterjee, Ranjan Ray) Tue, 08 Apr 2014 00:00:00 +0100 Guest editorial http://www.emeraldinsight.com/journals.htm?issn=1753-8254&volume=7&issue=1&articleid=17107556&show=abstract Introduction: Special issue on Corruption and Governance literatinetwork@emeraldinsight.com (Gautam Bose and Ajit Mishra) Tue, 08 Apr 2014 00:00:00 +0100