Signs that Markets are Coming Back: Volume 30

This study examines several aspects of active portfolio management by equity hedge funds between 1996 and 2013. Consistent with the idea that cross-sectional return dispersion is a proxy for the market’s available alpha, our results show that equity hedge funds achieve their strongest performance during periods of elevated dispersion. The performance advantage is robust to numerous risk adjustments. Portfolio managers may use the current month’s dispersion to plan the extent to which the following month’s investment approach will be active or passive. We also estimate the active share for equity hedge funds and find an average of 53%. We further document the average annual expense ratio for managing hedge funds’ active share to be about 7%. This figure is remarkably close to active expense ratios reported previously for equity mutual funds, which may be interpreted as evidence of uniform pricing for active portfolio management services.

Good market timing skills can be an important factor contributing to hedge funds’ outperformance. In this chapter, we use a unique semiparametric panel data model capable of providing consistent short period estimates of the return correlations with three market factors for a sample of Long/Short equity hedge funds. We find evidence of significant market timing ability by fund managers around market crisis periods. Studying the behavior of individual fund managers, we show that at the 10% significance level, 17.12% of funds exhibit good linear timing skills and 21.32% of funds possess some level of good nonlinear market timing skills. Further, we find that market timing strategies of hedge funds are different in good and bad markets, and that a significant number of managers behave more conservatively when the market return is expected to be far above average and more aggressively when the market return is expected to be far below average. We find that good market timers are also likely to possess good stock selection skills.

Analysis of Information Options offers new tools for evaluating investments in research, mineral exploration, logistics, energy transmission, and other information operations. With Information Options, the underlying assets are information assets and the rules governing exercise are based on the realities of the information realm (infosphere). Information Options can be modeled as options to “purchase” information assets by paying the cost of the information operations involved. Information Options arise at several stages of value creation. The initial stage involves observation of physical phenomena with accompanying data capture. The next refinement is to organize the data into structured databases. Then bits of information are selected from storage and synthesized into an information product (such as a management report). Next, the information product is presented to the user via an efficient interface that does not require the user to be a field expert. Information Options are similar in concept to real options but substantially different in their details, since real options have physical objects as the underlying assets and the rules governing exercise are based on the realities of the physical world. Also, while exercising a financial option typically kills the option, Information Options may include multiple exercises. Information Options may involve high volatility or jump processes as well, further enhancing their value. This chapter extends several important real option applications into the information realm, including jump process models and models for valuing options to synthesize any of n information items into any of m output assets.

Employers expect today’s undergraduates to possess a certain level of math and computer skills to do their jobs well. Are we, as business programs, providing them with the information and experiences that they need to meet those expectations? Our motivation for this research study is twofold: (a) to prepare our students to be competitive in the workplace and (b) to make the highest and best use of their time while in the program.

Real estate investment has been generally accepted as a value-adding proposition for a portfolio investor. Such an impression is not only shared by investment professionals and financial advisors but also appears to be supported by an overwhelming amount of research in the academic literature. The benefits of adding real estate as an asset class to a well-diversified portfolio are usually attributed to the respectable risk-return profile of real estate investment together with the relatively low correlation between its returns and the returns of other financial assets. By using the regime-switching technique on an extensive historical dataset, we attempt to look for the statistical evidence for such a claim. Unfortunately, the empirical support for the claim is neither strong nor universal. We find that any statistically significant improvement in risk-adjusted return is very much limited to the bullish environment of the real estate market. In general, the diversification benefit is not found to be statistically significant unless investors are relatively risk averse. We also document a regime-switching behavior of real estate returns similar to those found in other financial assets. There are two distinct states of the real estate market. The low-return (high-return) state is characterized by its high (low) volatility and its high (low) correlations with the stock market returns. We find this kind of dynamic risk characteristics to play a crucial role in dictating the diversification benefit from real estate investment.

We examine the ability of co-founders of a firm to create an artificial (or “homemade”) dividend as in Miller and Modigliani (1961). We employ traditional discounted valuation in showing that the act of creating an artificial dividend may decrease the value of the firm because it can divert funds from investment to the consumption of perquisites. Only where there is complete trust in the party to which the shares are sold can a co-founder costlessly create an artificial dividend. It seems likely that a dividend policy, idiosyncratic to the firm’s founders, would be established at the founding of the firm.