Treatment of silence as misrepresentation in contracts: A critical comparative analysis of common law and Islamic jurisprudence

This paper aims to provide a comparative discussion on silence as a misrepresentation in contractual obligations between common law and Islamic law. The objective of this paper is to – from a legal pluralism point of view – highlight the contrasts between the two traditions and provide recommendations for best practices to achieve fairness and equity among the contracting parties. While common law does not treat silence as conscious misrepresentation, in Islamic law, silence does not constitute affirmative will. This has repercussions for the contracting parties because if future disputes arise, the aggrieved party in Islamic law reserves the option to rescind or nullify the contract – an opportunity not afforded by common law. We have discussed and analyzed the implementations of the different contractual terms, such as fraud, misrepresentation, trickery and deception in relation with Islamic law principles and common law practices. This research is an effort to draw the attention for further development in both Islamic law and common law practices on contractual obligation. The notion of misrepresentation – subset of a broader gamut of fraud – is arguably nebulous in Islamic literature as well. We delve into these nuances and provide examples both from common law and Islamic law precedents and provide recommendations for reform in both traditions.

This paper operates under qualitative methodological framework and uses secondary sources for analysis. Sources include journal databases, review of cases, classical/medieval Islamic scripts, etc.

This paper provides a general comparative study between common law’s principle and practice and Islamic law’s principle to forge a better understanding of fine-tuning existing practice and contribute to the debate on determining the best practices to unify international trade and custom exercise. Common law principle, obviously, holds a historical and traditional reputation as those principles are derived from long years of practice and judicial interpretation. Such historical legal system should accommodate fresh ideas in their repertoire and welcome novel ideas which would positively influence its own practice. This paper affords the freedom to the reader to interpret which general principle is acceptable in terms of contractual obligation.

Previous works exist on the issue of misrepresentation. However, those are mostly explanations of fraud and deceit in Islamic law or common law. The treatment of silence as affirmative will is seldom touched upon. To the authors’ knowledge, this is the first attempt at contrasting the treatment of silence in common and Islamic law. They have also advocated pluralistic practices and argued for legal reform whereby both traditions can benefit from each other.