Exploring governance issues among boards of directors within state-owned enterprises in Barbados

The purpose of this paper is to examine corporate governance (CG) issues among boards of directors (BODs) in Barbados’ state-owned enterprises (SOEs) by utilizing agency and institutional theories as the theoretical framework.

This research adopts a mixed methods approach using quantitative and qualitative methods. Data are collected in five stages including data initially from a governance workshop attended by BODs. The findings are presented and feedback obtained in subsequent stages including several seminars attended by BODs, government officials, regulators and other stakeholders.

BODs perceive that they perform their roles and responsibilities in an effective and efficient manner, influence decision making, exercise control in SOEs and conduct well-organized meetings. However, respondents from the various stages report that there is lack of accountability and transparency, inadequate disclosure, lengthy board meetings resulting in excessive delays in decision making, unclear accounting and auditing guidelines, and a lack of training in financial and CG matters. Political interference, board appointment and composition are also cited as major concerns.

Suggestions include reduced political interference, increased training, following OECD (2005) best practices and greater accountability.

The paper extends the literature on CG in BODs in SOEs in emerging economies. This study utilizes the agency and institutional frameworks to understand the phenomenon.