Implementing globally desirable intellectual property rights in the emerging South

The purpose of this paper is to use a variety-expanding growth model embedded in the North–South framework to study the implementation of globally desirable protection of intellectual property rights (IPRs) in the emerging South.

The authors use a variety-expanding growth model with innovation-led economic growth in both North and South. As usual, imitations targeted equally at Northern and Southern innovations only occur in the South, and the authors focus on the design of Southern IPR protection.

Welfare-maximizing degrees of Southern IPR protection are explicitly derived for both North and South. There tends to exist a North–South conflict on the right degree of protection. To resolve this conflict, the Southern government can grant appropriate subsides to support domestic innovators. The authors derive the right rate of innovation subsidies such that the conflict is resolved.

This paper represents the first attempt to deal with the North–South conflict on the degree of Southern IPR protection within the variety-expanding growth model. And the novel perspective is to relax the North–South tension on IPR protection via additionally implementing an appropriate innovation subsidy policy.