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Corporate Behavior After the Proxy Contest for Control: The Short, Intermediate and Long Term

Tarun K. Mukherjee (Professor of Finance, University of New Orleans)
Oscar Varela (Associate Professor of Finance, University of New Orleans, New Orleans, LA 70148.)

Managerial Finance

ISSN: 0307-4358

Article publication date: 1 July 1992

55

Abstract

The effects of a proxy contest for control on a company are examined in this paper over a short, intermediate and long‐term post‐contest period of time. Major findings are as follows. First, compared to a non‐contest matchinggroup of firms, proxy contest for control firms as a whole are poor performers in the immediate post‐contest period. Successful contest firms, however, tend to improve performance whereas unsuccessful ones tend to deteriorate in the short‐term. Second, contest outcome does not appear to affect survivability over either the intermediate or long term. However, over the intermediate term, unsuccessful contest firms more often suffer losses and are acquired, and are less often involved in divestiture and expansion activities. Finally, in the long term, successful contest firms show a higher incidence of bank‐ruptcy and are more likely to engage in a name change.

Citation

Mukherjee, T.K. and Varela, O. (1992), "Corporate Behavior After the Proxy Contest for Control: The Short, Intermediate and Long Term", Managerial Finance, Vol. 18 No. 7/8, pp. 77-94. https://doi.org/10.1108/eb013704

Publisher

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MCB UP Ltd

Copyright © 1992, MCB UP Limited

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