Operational “problem” directors and environmental performance

The way in which a firm’s actions are perceived by others is driven by the individual values and ethics of directors (Ntim and Soobaroyen, 2013). The purpose of this paper is to examine the effects of “problem” directors on the environmental performance of firms. The authors argue that if a board member has a tainted reputation, then environmental performance will be higher as the problem director seeks to rebuild his/her reputation.

The authors use a sample of the top 500 US companies for 2010 and 2011 and an ordinary least square (OLS) model to capture the impact of “problem” directors on environmental performance. The authors use an independent measure of environmental performance which includes three categories: environmental impact, environmental management (green policies) and environmental reputation (which is affected by disclosure).

The findings of this paper show that the average environmental impact score is 53.32 per cent, the environmental management green policy score is 35.39 per cent and environmental reputation is 49.86 per cent. A firm which is operated by a problem director has a higher score for environmental management and environmental reputation than non-problem director-affiliated firms. Firms which are managed by a problem director(s) have lower scores for environmental impact than non-problem director-affiliated firms in the USA, indicating a higher level of emissions, water use, waste disposal, etc.

The authors posit that problem directors promote environmental performance as a means to enhance their reputation and divert attention from allegations of previous poor professional behaviour. Regulators and investors should interpret the environmental performance of a firm with caution when a problem director is on the board.

Prior research on the relationship between environmental performance and corporate governance has been based on board composition and characteristics. However, board decision-making reflects the professional experience and personal values of the directors. These factors have not been addressed in the literature to-date and, hence, form this paper’s contribution.