Governance and optimal financing for asset‐backed securitization

Abstract

Asset‐backed securitization (ABS) is an interesting financial innovation whereby debt instruments backed by cash flows generated from income‐producing assets are issued for investment purposes in the capital markets. This study examines the characteristics of ABS transactions in Singapore and evaluates whether proper governance mechanisms have been developed to protect ABS investors. We examined the unique features of the Visor case, such as rental guarantee, large block ownerships of junior bonds, credit enhancement, embedded options, managerial relationships between the SPV and servicers, and critically evaluated the effects of these characteristics on the governance of ABS. Rules on separation of banks' participation in ABS and the accountant's requirement of “clean sale” that affect the ABS structure were also discussed. We also develop a simple information asymmetric model to evaluate the pecking order choice of two different financing methods: collateralized loans and ABS.

Citation

Fan, G., Foo Sing, T., Eng Ong, S. and Sirmans, C.F. (2004), "Governance and optimal financing for asset‐backed securitization", Journal of Property Investment & Finance, Vol. 22 No. 5, pp. 414-434. https://doi.org/10.1108/14635780410556898