Fund managers’ herding and mutual fund governance

Abstract

Purpose

The purpose of this paper is to identify the implications of managerial herding for investors’ wealth and capital allocation across funds, and the critical role played by fund governance in monitoring herding incentives.

Design/methodology/approach

The author adopt the fund herding measure first proposed by Grinblatt et al. (1995) over the long sample period 1992-2007. Univariate and multivariate tests are then constructed to examine the relationship between managerial herding, performance, and investors’ sensitivities. OLS, fixed-effect panel data models are utilized to conduct the tests.

Findings

The author show that managers that do not herd have above-average managerial skills, trade less on noise, and significantly outperform herding managers. The author also illustrate that although fund herding could be used as a signal of managerial quality, underperforming herding funds manage to survive in equilibrium, indicating that investor flows do not adequately respond to the information content of a persistent herding behavior. Finally, the author demonstrate that better governance in the form of stronger managerial incentive schemes constitutes a significant deterrent against detrimental herding strategies, representing an effective monitoring device of the response of fund managers to poor flow-performance sensitivity.

Originality/value

The paper provides original evidence on the efficacy of external and internal governance in deterring wealth-reducing herding strategies. The author document that where more effective managerial incentives schemes are put in place by the management companies, fund managers are more likely to be better informed, resulting in fewer incentives to mimic the trading decisions of their peers.

Citation

Casavecchia, L. (2016), "Fund managers’ herding and mutual fund governance", International Journal of Managerial Finance, Vol. 12 No. 3, pp. 242-276. https://doi.org/10.1108/IJMF-12-2014-0197