Delegation and salary information disclosure strategies of customer acquisition and retention
Abstract
Purpose
The purpose of this study to improve the efficiency of customer acquisition and retention through the design of salary information disclosure mechanism.
Design/methodology/approach
This study develops a stylized game-theoretic model of delegating customer acquisition and retention, focusing on how firms choose delegation and wage information disclosure strategy.
Findings
The results confirm the necessity for enterprises to disclose salary information. When sales agents are risk neutral, firms should choose multi-agent (MA) delegation and disclose their wages. However, when agents are risk averse, firms may disclose the wages of acquisition agents or both agents in MA delegation, depending on the uncertainty of the retention market.
Originality/value
This paper contributes to the literature on delegation of customer acquisition and retention and demonstrates that salary disclosure can be used as a supplement to the incentive mechanism.
Keywords
Acknowledgements
The authors are thankful to the editor and the referees whose detailed reviews and suggestions helped to improve this article. The research is supported by National Natural Science Foundation of China (No. 71871184), the Philosophy and Social Science Foundation of Sichuan Province, China (No. SCJJ23ND3), the Fundamental Research Funds for the Central Universities (JBK190504) and the Guanghua Talent Project of Southwestern University of Finance and Economics.
Citation
Wang, W., Liao, Y. and Li, J. (2024), "Delegation and salary information disclosure strategies of customer acquisition and retention", Nankai Business Review International, Vol. ahead-of-print No. ahead-of-print. https://doi.org/10.1108/NBRI-03-2023-0030
Publisher
:Emerald Publishing Limited
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