The State’s Unintentional Production of Turf-controlling Neighborhood Elites in Twentieth Century Lima, Peru

Abstract

Many neo-Weberians adopt the state’s authority-monopolizing aim as their theoretical expectation. Through a case study of the Peruvian state and Lima’s squatter settlements, I provide evidence in support of the opposite contention: that states may unintentionally produce non-state extractive-coercive organizations. During the mid- to late-twentieth century, Lima’s population grew rapidly. Since they had few economic resources, the new urban poor requisitioned public lands and set up dozens of squatter settlements in the city’s periphery. Other researchers have identified several novel political phenomena stemming from such urban conditions. I focus here on the impact of the state. Using secondary and primary data, I examine three periods during which the state applied distinct settlement policies and one in which it did not apply a settlement policy, from 1948 to 1980. I find that when it applied each of the settlement policies, the state produced non-state political authorities – neighborhood elites – who extracted resources from squatters and tried to control neighborhood turf even against state encroachment, and that the state’s non-involvement did not produce them.

Citation

Newman, S.J. (2019), "The State’s Unintentional Production of Turf-controlling Neighborhood Elites in Twentieth Century Lima, Peru", The Politics of Land (Research in Political Sociology, Vol. 26), Emerald Publishing Limited, Leeds, pp. 15-37. https://doi.org/10.1108/S0895-993520190000026006