Decentralization and Military Coups

Abstract

We develop a multiperiod contest theory model to formulate the role of decentralization in coups decision and outcome. In our model the coup plotter chooses between carrying out a coup and subordination, the central government responds by fighting against the plotter, and the local government chooses whether to confront the military government after a successful coup. The model shows that more decentralized countries will experience longer military regime after a successful coup, but the relationship between decentralization and the risk of coups is nonmonotonic. We suggest that there may exist negative consequences of decentralization: Depending on the initial conditions, decentralization may increase the coup risks and jeopardize political stability.

Citation

Jia, R. and Liang, P. (2012), "Decentralization and Military Coups", Bo, C., Chatterji, M. and Chaoyan, H. (Ed.) Cooperation for a Peaceful and Sustainable World Part 1 (Contributions to Conflict Management, Peace Economics and Development, Vol. 20 Part 1), Emerald Group Publishing Limited, Leeds, pp. 149-170. https://doi.org/10.1108/S1572-8323(2012)0000020009