Does Directors and Officers Liability Insurance Matter for Stock-Price Synchronicity?

Abstract

This chapter examines the relationship between directors and officers (D&O) liability insurance and stock-price synchronicity by testing competing corporate governance-related monitoring and moral hazard-related agency conflict hypotheses. Testing a sample of stocks listed on the Taiwan Stock Exchange and the Taipei Exchange for 2008–2020, the empirical results of this study indicate that D&O insurance in Taiwan is negatively correlated to stock-price synchronicity. This negative relation is robust to a battery of tests, including those of fixed-effects regression models, alternative sample periods, alternative synchronicity measures, and alternative insurance measures. Further evidence indicates that this negative relationship is more pronounced among firms with greater agency problems, especially during periods of high market uncertainty. Overall, these findings support the corporate governance-related monitoring hypothesis, which posits that firms with greater D&O insurance are likelier to be characterized by better governance structures and information transparency. Additionally, their stock prices are more likely to reflect firm-specific information in a timely and precise manner, and they are more likely to have lower synchronicity with the industry and market.

Citation

Lo, B.-H., Shieh, L.-F., Shih, Y.-C. and Hsieh, M.-D. (2023), "Does Directors and Officers Liability Insurance Matter for Stock-Price Synchronicity?", Lee, C.-F. and Yu, M.-T. (Ed.) Advances in Pacific Basin Business, Economics and Finance (Advances in Pacific Basin Business, Economics and Finance, Vol. 11), Emerald Publishing Limited, Leeds, pp. 221-240. https://doi.org/10.1108/S2514-465020230000011010