Marine

Citation

(2001), "Marine", Disaster Prevention and Management, Vol. 10 No. 4. https://doi.org/10.1108/dpm.2001.07310dac.001

Marine

Marine

29 October 2000 – Kursk (Russia)

Divers resumed work yesterday to recover bodies from the sunken nuclear submarine Kursk, after a fierce storm that had delayed operations abated, a Navy official said. Norwegian divers were preparing to cut a hole into the submarine's rearmost ninth compartment. "The divers went down to the submarine and started to remove rubber coating in advance of cutting a hole in the ninth compartment of the submarine," Vadim Serga, a spokesman for the Northern Fleet, said. The Russian-Norwegian team of divers had to suspend their work Friday (27 October) because winds of up to 56mph tossed the mission's ships so hard on the surface of the Barents Sea that divers 356ft below risked being jerked on their tethers. Safety precautions taken by the Norwegian divers made it possible for them to resume the operation, but Russian divers could not work until the waves were less than 12ft.

30 October 2000 – Fighting harsh weather in the Barents Sea, Norwegian and Russian divers recovered eight more bodies from the Kursk, a navy spokesman said today. The divers had pulled the remains out of the shattered vessel and brought them to the surface over the weekend, said Capt. Vladimir Navrotsky, spokesman for the Russian Navy's Northern Fleet. The bodies were still on the divers' mother-ship, Regalia, because a storm prevented helicopters from flying out from the mainland to carry them to shore, Navrotsky said. That brought to 12 the number of bodies retrieved so far in the risky operation. Efforts to locate/retrieve further bodies are continuing, with divers working around the clock in shifts.

31 October 2000 – Russian and Norwegian divers abandoned their search for remains in the rear of the sunken Kursk nuclear submarine and shifted to the front of the vessel, naval officials said today. The change in plans contradicted officials' earlier statements that the seamen in the front sections had almost certainly been blown to pieces when the Kursk's weapons detonated 12 August in a powerful explosion, equal in force to a 3.5-magnitude earthquake. By moving to the front of the submarine, naval officials may be hoping to gather clues on what caused the disaster that killed the Kursk's 118 crewmen. The divers have done all they could in the ninth compartment in the stern, said Russian Northern Fleet spokesman Vladimir Navrotsky. Navrotsky said that there was hope of recovering remains from the third compartment in the fore of the Kursk, where the divers starting slicing a hole in the hull today. The divers had covered a hole they cut in the submarine's hull over the eighth compartment with a special steel cover and also shut the exit hatch in the ninth compartment, preserving the wreck.

1 November 2000 – Russian and Norwegian divers extended their working hours during a spell of clear, frosty weather over the Barents Sea today, as they struggle to search the sunken nuclear submarine Kursk before storms again set in. After retrieving 12 bodies from the stern of the wreck in the Arctic depths, the divers sealed the entrances to the rear compartments and moved their search to the mangled front. Russian media and other observers have speculated that the navy may be seeking to recover sensitive military equipment and documents that could shed light on what caused the tragedy, before heavy storms put the Kursk out of reach for months. But naval officials insist that they are looking for bodies. The third compartment, where divers were working today, was the location of a rescue vehicle that was designed to carry seamen to the surface in case of emergency. Russian and Norwegian divers have removed the rubber coating from the hull over the third compartment in the Kursk's fore part, and have cut a hole in the thinner, outer hull of the submarine, Northern Fleet spokesman Vladimir Navrotsky said today. The divers were clearing obstacles from between the Kursk's two hulls, and were planning to begin cutting the thick steel of the inner hull tomorrow, Navrotsky said. The divers' shifts were extended from four to six hours under water, as they worked to get inside the fore part of the wreck, Navrotsky said. "Time is pressing, as the weather can sour again," he said. The heavy fogs that had blanketed the Arctic site for days have lifted, and storms have subsided. The lull is expected to last for another two to three days, Navrotsky said.

5 November 2000 – Russian and Norwegian divers entered the living quarters of the sunken nuclear submarine Kursk today and found it badly damaged, but did not locate any more bodies of missing crewmen, a navy official said. The divers were able to penetrate only one yard into the fourth compartment, and visibility was poor, navy spokesman Capt. Vladimir Navrotsky said. A preliminary inspection of the fourth compartment with video cameras showed extensive damage to the partitions between the living and service areas, but the wall dividing it from the third compartment remained intact, Navrotsky said. Divers yesterday moved their search for bodies towards less damaged areas of the vessel after failing to enter a shattered third forward compartment earlier in the week. So far, only 12 bodies have been recovered. The cause of the accident remains unknown. Russian officials have theorised that a collision with a foreign submarine set off the blasts. Others have suggested that a technical malfunction caused a torpedo to explode in its tube. A state commission of inquiry will convene in Moscow on Wednesday (8 November), the Interfax news agency reported yesterday. It said that the diving operation will be completed by the end of next week.

7 November 2000 – Russian navy officials today considered cancelling a risky diving operation to retrieve bodies from the sunken nuclear submarine Kursk, as high waves buffeted the divers' mother vessel on the Barents Sea. Operators hoisted the Russian and Norwegian divers to the surface, as high winds pounded their mother vessel Regalia, threatening to jerk divers around on their tethers. Divers have worked in shifts around the clock for 17 days, with previous pauses because of harsh weather. The painstaking work to remove debris and search for bodies in the submarine's fourth compartment was halted today. Before surfacing, divers welded a metal plate over the hole they had cut in the compartment, the ITAR-Tass news agency reported. Faced with worsening weather, navy officials met today to consider cancelling the operation altogether, North Fleet spokesman Vladimir Navrotsky said. They discussed raising the Regalia's anchor and departing to Norway by late today, he said. Divers faced mounting challenges and risks if the operation were to continue, he said. The divers had worked two days to remove jagged debris from the upper deck of the fourth compartment, yet could only move six feet along a single passage way, and no remains were found. On the surface, winds increased to 32-38mph, rocking the Regalia, and rain and wet snow swirled around the vessel.

8 November 2000 – The mission to retrieve bodies from the sunken Russian nuclear submarine Kursk has been abandoned. Faced with severe weather in the Barents Sea and treacherous conditions inside the submarine, mission commanders decided yesterday that they could do no more. The 18-day mission recovered the bodies of only 12 of the 118 men who died when the Kursk sank in August. Divers have now embarked on a final mission to study the outside of the vessel, ahead of plans to try raising it next year. The Norwegian oil platform Regalia, from which the operation had been run, left the scene around 12.00, local time, yesterday, said a spokesman for her owners.

2 November 2000 – Azteca X

Mexico fv Azteca X and Indonesia fv Permata 00 were in collision in lat 11 03N, long. 116 52W, during the evening, local time, 31 October. As a result Permata 00 was cut in two, and of her crew one person was rescued alive, 12 persons were dead and three missing, believed dead. Coast Guard cutter Boutwell has been diverted to the scene of a collision involving the 60-foot Indonesian fv Permata 00 and 232-foot Mexican fv Azteca X that occurred at approximately 23.00 last night 800 miles south-southwest of Cabo San Lucas, Mexico. The force of the collision cut Permata 00 in two. There were 16 people on board Permata 00. One survivor has been recovered along with 11 bodies. Four people are still missing. Azteca X sustained no serious damage and is assisting with the recovery operation. Permata 00 capsized, but did not sink. The stern of the vessel has been lashed to the side of Azteca X, while the bow has been lashed to another fishing vessel. There are four other fishing vessels assisting with the recovery mission. Boutwell is due to arrive sometime Thursday morning.

2 November 2000 – Manila Spirit (Panama)

Mv Manila Spirit (5,927gt, built 1982) went aground and subsequently sank in lat. 25 04.4N, long. 121 53.IE, yesterday morning in bad weather. One crew member rescued, 23 missing. Taipei: Mv Manila Spirit sank during a typhoon off Taiwan's north-east coast and only one of the 24-member crew had been found, disaster response officials said today. The National Fire Administration, which handles search and rescue missions, said the vessel sank yesterday in seas off north-eastern Sanhao Point, while typhoon "Xangsane" swept north through Taiwan. One crew member swam to shore and was in hospital. Two helicopter searches today failed to turn up any more survivors and a rescue vessel had been sent to the area, the administration said in a statement.

3 November 2000 – A total of 23 sailors on mv Manila Spirit were missing after the vessel ran aground off northern Taiwan in stormy weather on Wednesday, port officials said yesterday. An Indonesian crew member swam ashore after the vessel broke up in rough seas off the town of Juifang. "Rescue helicopters were repeatedly forced to abort their search missions due to bad weather," Tseng Sheng-chih, an official at the northern Keelung port, said. Coastguard units had sent vessels to search for the crew. Manila Spirit, which sailed from Manila, was bound for Hualien, Taipei.

5 November 2000 – Express Samina (Greece)

New evidence concerning the sinking of ro-ro m ferry Express Samina, which went down off the Cycladic island of Paros in late September killing at least 80 of its passengers, was brought to light yesterday. Reports stated that the team of divers inspecting the vessel's sunken remains found that the radar had been destroyed and that the control manoeuvring mechanism on the vessel's bridge had been tampered with. Further reports speculated that the vessel's wreck had been looted, as money was found missing from its treasury. Nikos Karadimitriou, the appeals magistrate who is heading the investigation into the incident, arrived on Paros yesterday to continue his inspection of the Express Samina's remains. He told reporters that he had taken the claims that the wreck had been tampered with into consideration, but he was also reviewing other possible explanations for the mysterious destruction of the vessel's instruments. The experts, who are piecing together evidence filmed by the investigating diving crew currently performing an autopsy on the Express Samina, reportedly supported the view that the damage sustained by the radar – which was allegedly smashed and removed from its position – could not have been caused during the collision, or the sinking. Meanwhile, days after the 26 September sinking, second mechanic Andreas Sorocos told reporters that the Express Samina had serious technical faults, which led him to resign. Specifically he mentioned a fault in the electrical connection between the control manoeuvring mechanism on the bridge and the engine room, which meant that the captain's order to turn the vessel may never have been received by the engine-room. The mayor of Parikia, Costas Argouzis, who also spoke to Flash radio yesterday, had made claims shortly after the vessel's sinking that divers had gone down into the vessel's remains without permission from the coastguard and had taken items from it. A member of the Paros Coastguard said yesterday that all divers who entered the vessel's remains had done so under the supervision of the coastguard at all times.

7 November 2000 – Two coastguard officials reportedly were charged with criminal negligence today in connection with the sinking ro-ro m ferry Express Samina. Coastguard Commodore Darnianos Doumanis and port police Commander Antonis Pitsoulakis were charged with disrupting the safety of shipping traffic and possibly endangering lives, the official Athens News Agency reported. The two also were accused of allowing the 34-year-old ferry to operate without documents certifying that it was seaworthy. Other coast guard officials are accused of failing to take action when they were informed in July that many ferries did not meet safety standards, the agency said. The ferry's captain Vasilis Yiannakis, currently in custody pending trial on charges equivalent to murder, was also accused of setting sail without certification for the boat. The operator of the ferry, Minoan Flying Dolphins, has been served with criminal charges for exposing passengers to danger.

10 November 2000 – A court awarded $250,000 yesterday to a survivor of ro-ro m ferry Express Samina, the first ruling in dozens of lawsuits against the vessel's owners, local Greek media said. Greek passenger Stathis Livieratos, 22, had sued the ferry's operator for damages from the accident, the official Athens News Agency said. The company, Minoan Flying Dolphins, said that it would appeal against the decision, but it must deposit a check for the full amount with the court within three days as a guarantee until the appeal procedure is completed, ANA said. Dozens of lawsuits seeking compensation totalling more than $32.5 million have been filed against the company by crew members, survivors and relatives of those who died.

7 November 2000 – Estonia (Estonia)

The scientific examination of metal fragments recovered from m passenger ro-ro ferry Estonia wreck show that an explosion occurred on board the vessel, claims US businessman Gregg Bemis, who led the controversial diving expedition. In August, divers had cut from the wreck two metal pieces measuring around 15 cm each. These have been analysed by two German institutes, the Materialprufungsanstalt Brandenburg and the Institut für Materialprufung und Werkstofftechnik in Clausthal-Zellerfeld, said German television journalist Jutta Rabe, who accompanied the expedition. The institutes concluded that an explosion had taken place "without a doubt" at the bow visor of the ferry, Ms Rabe said. Only a blast could have resulted in the structural changes of the metal pieces, the scientists noted. Two further examinations are currently being completed in Germany and the USA. The results of all four analyses will be presented to the public in three to four weeks' time, Ms Rabe said. The recent findings support conclusions revealed last December by the German group of experts set up by the Estonia's builders Meyer Werft. The group said that, before the vessel sank, a number of small explosions hit the vessel, which were partly responsible for her fast sinking. Together with the extremely poor maintenance of the vessel and the fact that the upper extension of the collision bulkhead was not in the location required by the IMO, the explosions were sufficient to cause the catastrophe.

8 November 2000 – Derbyshire (UK)

Mr Justice Colman is to deliver today the findings of his inquiry into the 1980 sinking of bulk/oil mv Derbyshire, with the loss of 44 lives. Deputy prime minister John Prescott took the unusual step of announcing the reopening of the formal inquiry into the accident in 1998, following a survey of the wreck. Proceedings will start at the Royal Courts of Justice in The Strand, London, at 10.30hrs and are expected to last about one hour. Copies of the full report will shortly be available from the Stationery Office. The biggest vessel in the UK fleet, the Bibby Line 269,044dwt vessel was built by Swan Hunter, state-owned at the time, and classified by Lloyd's Register. Controversy has consistently surrounded her fate over the last two decades. The Derbyshire Family Campaign – established by the victims' relatives – has consistently maintained that a fundamental design fault at frame 65 was to blame. Other experts have claimed that bad seamanship could have contributed, particularly the unsecured foredeck stores hatch cover. There is evidence to suggest that ventilator pipes on the bow may have led to ingress at the front end of the vessel, causing her to go down at the head, enabling a big wave to crush hatch covers. A spokesman for UK officers' union Numast said: "The issue of vindication of the crew is something we have fought for all the way down the line." Nevertheless, he added, there were wider issues at stake.

9 November 2000 – The master and crew of bulk/oil mv Derbyshire – the 269,044dwt bulk carrier, which sank in 1980 with a loss of 44 lives – were yesterday cleared of bad seamanship, with the publication of a report into the accident by a High Court judge. Mr Justice Colman instead attributed the tragedy to inadequate hatch covers, which collapsed in typhoon conditions in the Pacific. An earlier government report in 1998 had argued that the crew virtually invited their own deaths. But Mr Colman explicitly argued: "This report rejects the assessors' conclusion that the crew had left the hatch lid inadequately secured prior to the Derbyshire entering the typhoon." Campaigners in the Derbyshire Family Association, made up of victims' families, were yesterday delighted with the vindication of their loved ones. Other parties, including the government, which owned the then-nationalised shipyard that built the Derbyshire, owner Bibby Lines, classification society Lloyd's Register, and the Oceanroutes routeing agency, will also be happy that they were not blamed for the loss. Mr Justice Colman explicitly rejected the contention that the vessel suffered structural failure at frame 65, a problem observed on two of her sisters. Nevertheless, there was "shown to have been a substantial misalignment of longitudinal bulkheads at bulkhead 65". This is branded an "error in construction" that would have created a "very low additional safety risk". Routeing agency Oceanroutes at no time advised the master to alter course to avoid the typhoon, and sent messages "seriously deficient in information". However, the report did not accept that Oceanroutes was negligent or otherwise at fault. On the basis of the survey and model tests, "it can be concluded with reasonable confidence that the initiating cause of the loss was the destruction of some or all of the ventilators and air pipes located on the foredeck by sustained green water loading over many hours". The Derbyshire then developed a trim by the bow, imperceptible from the bridge, which accentuated green water loading on the No. 1 hatch cover. That hatch cover collapsed, flooding the hold. This in turn increased green water loading on hatch cover No. 2, allowing water to enter the second hold. "No. 3 hatch cover suffered the same fate. At that point the vessel was irretrievably lost." Hatch cover strength standards are covered by the International Load Line Convention 1966 (ILLC 66). At the time the Derbyshire was built, naval architects could properly rely on the requirements of ILLC 66 as a design benchmark, said Mr Justice Colman. "The UK should press strongly and urgently for the convention to be amended by the introduction of a new formula for the calculation of minimum hatch cover strength in relation to minimum permissible free-board," said Mr Justice Colman. However, such changes would take four to five years to enforce, and IACS should in the interim introduce a tougher standard than UR S21.

9 November 2000 – Sleipner (Norway)

A commission yesterday cited poor navigation as the broad cause of last November's m ferry Sleipner accident that claimed 16 lives, but directed specific criticism at the Norwegian Maritime Directorate, ship owner Hardanger Sunnhordlandske Dampskipsselskap, shipbuilder Austal and class society Det Norske Veritas. The 252-page report recommended significant changes to existing high-speed regulations, in order to "proactively prevent" such accidents in future. But the document drew criticism from a few maritime experts and people claiming to speak for the victims, who said that it did not go far enough. There were rumours last month that the report might press charges of gross neglect against the ship owner and the Maritime Directorate. This did not take place. "Somebody has decided not to criticise too strongly," a source close to the Directorate said. "The report is a bit vague, perhaps deliberately so, to try to cool things down." The report concluded that the Sleipner was designed and built according to applicable high-speed craft rules, save for some key lapses. The emergency power batteries that supply power before the emergency generator starts up were placed too low, instead of above the waterline. The emergency power source itself was located in the port pontoon, partly below the final waterline after damage. This location was in violation of the Sleipner's drawings. The Maritime Directorate, the product and electrical safety directorate, and DNV failed to detect this defect during inspections. Based on studies on sister-ship Draupner, the commission surmised that DNV may have missed minor openings in the longitudinals between wet deck and main deck, which resulted in the longitudinals not being watertight. Shipbuilder Austal got off with censure for not ensuring the transitional power sources' adherence to approved drawings. The report attacked the Maritime Directorate over life-jackets. The jackets were said to have been type-approved by UK authorities, and in accordance with EEA rules. The commission said "many passengers had difficulty in keeping the jackets in position, and it cannot be precluded that [this] deficiency may have had significance for the number of survivors". Only 69 passengers escaped alive. The Directorate was further chastised for a "serious defect" in the life-raft arrangement. The raft containers did not have type-approved hydrostatic release units, which were on the original drawings but were mysteriously removed. This fault directly contributed to the confusion surrounding the launch of the Sleipner's life-rafts, two of which could never be released, while a third foundered in high wind. The commission also criticised the Directorate for certifying the Sleipner for operation in a significant wave height of 1m, a level which experienced Norwegian mariners dismiss as unrealistic. The commission accepted that the wave height during the incident was 2.3m, and said bluntly that the Sleipner should not have sailed that night. "Instead, the Directorate should have waited, and not issued the permit before an adverse weather evacuation trial" – something which was never carried out. However, the main cause of the accident was seen to be poor navigation. The navigators onboard had not received training in the use of navigational aids. The ship-owner did not have a procedure for measuring the actual wave height. The navigators did not know where they were when Sleipner ran aground. At the decisive moment, both navigators were busy, each adjusting their own radar, which distracted their attention from visual navigation. Following the grounding, Sleipner officers organised no evacuation. The crew's conduct as a unit was affected by the lack of a leader. The commission said that it is the "navigators who have first-line responsibility" in such an accident. It saw "no grounds for formal criticism of the ship-owner as regards design and equipment", but the said company's compliance failed in many respects. This comment annoyed the Maritime Directorate source. He asked why the ship-owner's ISM certification was not revoked immediately after the mishap. He termed this "a mockery of the many years spent developing ISM". The commission recommends righting all the equipment and procedural lapses noted in its report. Other recommendations include self-righting life-rafts, making the fast ferry code mandatory in domestic Norwegian traffic, introducing Ecdis on fast ferries, "strengthening coastal infrastructure", and a 15-minute turnout time on rescue helicopters.

23 November 2000 – Dashun (People's Republic of China)

A total of 17 officials and company managers have been disciplined or are to face criminal investigation over the disaster involving ferry Dashun last November. The ferry, with 312 passengers and crew on board, caught fire in heavy seas and gale-force winds on 24 November as she headed from Yantai to Dalian port in Liaoning province. A total of 282 people lost their lives in the incident. For the first time, authorities have also issued "administrative punishment" to a provincial governor and a minister for neglecting their "leadership responsibilities" over the accident. Shandong Governor Li Chunting and Communications Minister Huang Zhendong were given the unprecedented punishment, Xinhua reported yesterday. Although the punishment was mild compared with those faced by others, it will stay on their personal records and will count against their career in the future. Xinhua said four of the 17 faced criminal investigation. They were general manager Gao Feng, his deputy Yu Chuanlong, and Fan Shihui, a safety supervisor with the Yantai Ferry Car Company. Du Jijun, a safety officer of Yantai's Harbour Administation Bureau, has also been transferred to the judiciary for investigation. The large death toll from last November's disaster has alarmed the central Government, which has put Vice-Premier Wu Bangguo in charge of the investigation. A report compiled by the investigation team said misjudgment by the ferry captain, who died in the disaster, navigational mistakes and overloading were principal causes of the accident.

23 November 2000 – Erika (Malta)

Inadequate maintenance and the failure to deal with fast-developing corrosion were the root causes of the break-up and sinking of m tanker Erika last December, according to the French marine accident investigation bureau. In a confidential draft version of its final report circulated to the interested parties and obtained by Lloyd's List, the bureau concludes unequivocally that these two failures led to a weakening in the area of the tank number two starboard of the Erika, where the fatal break-up initiated. The conclusions of the French reports are in line with the finding of the Maltese administration. Both appear to strongly criticise the operator of Rina, the Italian classification society. As for the causes of the corrosion from which Erika was suffering, it says that the deterioration of her state "really began" when her number two and four wing tanks were designated for use as ballast rather than for cargo. On the basis of analysis of samples, it says that it found a serious loss of thickness in hull plating and the use of replacement plate with a thickness of 12mm rather than 16mm during the repairs in August 1998. In reinforced areas, it found missing weld lines and losses of thickness up to 30 per cent, which it says confirmed that there was widespread general corrosion, as well as numerous small patches of deep corrosion. These patches, with a surface area of just a few square centimetres, were "by far the most dangerous", it says, adding that repair work carried out at the Bijela yard in the summer of 1998 had also played a determining role in the chain of events leading to the final accident. The stresses to which the Erika's hull was subject could have been altered, it says, by the use of thinner plate, "hazardous decisions" regarding cuts made into her structure, plating and bulkheads and errors with regard to the precision of assemblies and welds. The new stresses thus provoked could only have facilitated the formation of breaks and small cracks, followed by a major crack provoking the start of a process of large-scale structural failure, which could have taken several months to reach its term. "It is, then, the insufficient maintenance and, coincidentally, the rapid development of non-treated corrosion which are at the origin of the weakening of the structure around the number two tank area of the Erika", the draft report concludes, "a weakening which resulted in a series of ruptures leading to the total ruin of the whole". "This factor is determining to the point of being able to consider the other factors as relatively secondary," the bureau continues, apparently discounting the argument of Italian classification society, Rina, which claimed that Erika's master, Karun Mathur, was partly responsible for the vessel's loss. "In short," it says, "the state of the ship and its rapid deterioration in the final hours were such that there was no possibility of avoiding the catastrophe." The bureau makes a number of recommendations, many of them already contained in the preliminary report it issued in January. The largest number are directed at the classification societies, who are urged to pay greater attention to the prevention and surveillance of corrosion and to improve their methods for evaluating hull strength. The report recommends that they should transfer complete classification files on ships which change classification society. More controversially, it says that they should also abandon their duty of confidentiality to owners in the event of casualty or serious doubts about a vessel's seaworthiness. In such instances, it says, they should be ready to supply ship files to the authorities of the country concerned, whether as port state or as the state in whose waters the vessel is situated. It also calls on the classification societies to improve their emergency procedures, notably through the creation of 24-hour call services, capable of replying immediately to questions posed by masters and owners of vessels suffering from structural or stability problems. In a new recommendation, it urges international bodies to limit the proliferation of instructions to masters who, it says, are unable to take them all into account when they find themselves in emergency situations. It recommends flag states who contract out their certification attributions to ensure that they have the necessary legal and technical capacities to exercise real control over the work which is being carried out in their name. Oil companies and traders are urged to bring into line the safety and quality criteria they use for vessels taken on voyage charter with those they use for vessels taken on time charter. It also maintains its earlier controversial recommendation to French oil companies to bring back under ownership and French flag the majority of vessels they use for the transportation of crude oil and products. It adds this time, however, that the same advice is valid for other oil companies.