SCOSS issues "benchmark" report

Citation

(2001), "SCOSS issues "benchmark" report", Disaster Prevention and Management, Vol. 10 No. 5. https://doi.org/10.1108/dpm.2001.07310eab.005

SCOSS issues "benchmark" report

SCOSS issues "benchmark" report

In its 13th report, Structural Safety 2000-01, the Standing Committee on Structural Safety (SCOSS) discusses themes that have frequently emerged from the committee's deliberations over the last two years.

The report includes 17 conclusions covering the control of risks to structural safety, dynamic response of structures, naturally-occurring environmental hazards to structures – including climate change – and duties to warn and heed warnings. SCOSS draws attention in the report to the substantial changes that have occurred in the construction industry in recent years as a result of pressures for greater efficiency, productivity and safety.

Most changes, even changes intended to improve safety, can have some detrimental effects on safety. The possible detrimental effects of changes on structural safety need to be effectively countered or compensated for. Keeping risks to structural safety (and safety more generally) acceptably low requires a learning culture throughout the industry. However, events that could lead to disputes or enforcement actions often inhibit release of information from experience and, hence, the spread of learning. SCOSS suggests that answers to the resulting dilemmas depend on developing a proper sense of balance.

Comment on the Report and feedback to SCOSS of experience relating to structural safety are invited.

The conclusions in the Report are listed below.

1. 1.

   The control of risks to structural safety

2. 2.

   Structural safety can be placed at risk by active errors by designers, site personnel and the like and by latent errors introduced through inadequate procurement procedures, codes, standards and regulations.

3. 3.

   Codes and standards provide a core means of controlling risks to structural safety. Identified shortcomings should be addressed with urgency. It must be recognised that there may be gaps in codes and they may not cover recent innovation.

4. 4.

   The control of risks to structural safety depends primarily on the competence and integrity of individuals and organisations. The possibility that individuals or organisations might not be competent, or that their competence might be affected by commercial or other pressures is a risk to structural safety and needs to be controlled.

5. 5.

   Supervision and management systems used to control risks to structural safety should include appropriately independent arrangements for checking safety-critical elements. There is doubt as to whether systems conforming with ISO 9000 are adequate for this purpose.

6. 6.

   The certification of structural safety-related work should be entrusted only to appropriately qualified and experienced engineers.

7. 7.

   Certification by the work originator of the design and construction of structures whose failure would not have high consequences can give adequate assurance of structural safety provided there are appropriate systems in place for ensuring competence.

8. 8.

   For safety-critical aspects of design and construction of structures whose failure would have high consequences, third party independent certification is needed to give adequate assurance of structural safety.

9. 9.

   For structures whose failure would have high consequences and for structures that are innovative or unfamiliar in relation to the experience of the project team, an explicit process of risk management should be used. The process should include the systematic identification of hazards and assessment of risks to structural safety, followed by the selection of critical situations for design.

   Dynamic response of structures

10. 10.

    Specifically targeted research is needed to evaluate the uncertainties in the structural design of cantilever seating desks for dynamic effects and to assist the IStructE/DETR/DCMS Working Group.

11. 11.

    There may be many bridges that have only experienced moderate pedestrian traffic and have performed well but which, if subject to greater pedestrian density, could suffer strong lateral vibrations.

12. 12.

    Where previously unknown structural behaviour is observed, whether failure has occurred or not, it is incumbent upon professional engineers to report the observations in the technical literature, if possible, so that others are alerted to potential risks to safety.

13. 13.

    The identification of dynamically sensitive structures and the visualisation and understanding of structural behaviour at the design stage may not be sufficiently well covered in the education and formation of civil and structural engineers.

    Naturally-occurring environmental hazards to structures, including climate change

14. 14.

    The consequences for structural safety of climate change should be regarded as a national and international issue. Consequences should be assessed taking account of the uncertainties existing in the predictions of climate change. Changes should be quantified by continuous monitoring and analysis of the climate.

15. 15.

    A prudent minimum approach for maintaining structural safety as climate change occurs would be to update design and assessment criteria as change is confirmed. Anticipating climate change in design and assessment may be justified in some cases, particularly if evidence is found that a significant change is taking place over a short timescale relative to the life of structures, say 50-200 years.

16. 16.

    Research is needed into the sensitivity of structures to climate change to determine thresholds at which the updating of design values and the strengthening of existing structures may be necessary to maintain acceptable structural safety.

17. 17.

    Giving and heeding warnings are essential parts of ensuring structural safety. In difficult situations, the Royal Academy of Engineering Draft Guidelines for Warnings of Preventable Disasters are commended to engineers.

18. 18.

    Views would be welcomed by the committee on whether the establishment of a system for confidential reporting on matters affecting structural safety , or safety in construction generally, is needed and would be used.

The 13th SCOSS Report was published on 21 June 2001, by The Institution of Structural Engineers, 11 Upper Belgrave Street, London SW1X 8BH, UK, price £25.00. ISBN 090129716X. The report is 43 pages long.

Further information about the 13th SCOSS Report and the Standing Committee on Structural Safety may be obtained from: Dr John Menzies (Secretary) or Mr John Fenn (Technical Officer), The Standing Committee on Structural Safety, 11 Upper Belgrave Street, London SW1 8BH. UK. Tel: +44 (0)207 201 9133; Fax: +44 (0)207 201 9165. E-mail: SCOSS@istructe.org.uk