S.A.E. National Aeronautic Meeting: Summaries of Papers at the Meeting held in New York, April 8–11, 1958

Abstract

The background of missile costs is discussed. Missiles are new and very costly. Developments in this field have been subjected to political vicissitudes which have often upset long‐term developments. Missile technology is on the frontier of science and there is no background of knowledge to draw on; much basic and expensive research is required. Missile engineering models are complex in detail and assembly, and therefore costly, and constant change occurs while making and testing the model. The complexity and functional requirements of missile parts are running a parallel race with the machines and processes being developed to fabricate the materials required. The usually small runs required in missile production again add to costs. Imposed on all these activities is the requirement that reliability of near 100 per cent is needed and in no case can reliability be allowed to be secondary to cost. The inflight life and shelf conditions for a missile are usually fairly well established and 100 per cent reliability for a short operating life with a long shelf life are the real requirements. There is a considerable tendency to overdesign for reliability. Some costly features of design such as finest finish, closest tolerances and highest strength are carried over by habit from aircraft design and are not always required in missiles. Having examined some causes of high costs, a programme for cost reduction is set out. Costs can be reduced by: (i) earlier freezing of designs making changes only in groups of several changes at wider intervals, (ii) making a more realistic approach to reliability designs, (iii) selecting tolerances in a more analytical manner according to individual needs, (iv) selecting materials on the basis of actual design requirements instead of using the very best materials available even when the short life makes them unnecessary, (v) avoiding tool‐room methods in production engineering, (vi) setting work standards on as many operations as possible and enforcing them to the greatest degree possible, (vii) selecting the best type of workers to make the transition from development models to production missiles as smooth as possible, and (viii) setting up rigid systems and parts designation procedures for handling production parts. Finally, methods of organizing research and development and production for bridging the gap between engineering design and production are proposed.

Citation

(1958), "S.A.E. National Aeronautic Meeting: Summaries of Papers at the Meeting held in New York, April 8–11, 1958", Aircraft Engineering and Aerospace Technology, Vol. 30 No. 8, pp. 236-242. https://doi.org/10.1108/eb033003