Gift and Trojan horses!

Citation

Rider, B. (2010), "Gift and Trojan horses!", Journal of Money Laundering Control, Vol. 13 No. 2. https://doi.org/10.1108/jmlc.2010.31013baa.001

Gift and Trojan horses!

Article Type: Editorial From: Journal of Money Laundering Control, Volume 13, Issue 2

An interesting and potentially extremely significant issue, which has been brought out into the open as a result of the Conservative Party’s recently revealed plans for the re-structuring of the intelligence and security apparatus in the UK, is the extent to which it is appropriate to utilise development resources and relationships to promote policies concerned with the interdiction of terrorism and organised crime. Mr David Cameron’s recent undertaking to use some of the Department for International Development’s (DFID) budget for establishing and operating an international stabilisation and reconstruction force has been met with cries of outrage from the traditional development agencies. He seeks in this initiative to provide assistance in circumstances where the conventional aid organisations dare to tread.

However, it is naïve in the extreme to think that aid has always been doled out without strings attached or those that who have been involved in the process have not had other agendas. In fact, DFID – albeit through consultants, has been very much involved in issues of stability and the disruption of crime around the world, including Afghanistan. Indeed, over 30 years ago Commonwealth Governments established a special unit to, at an intelligence level – disrupt organised crime and in particular disrupt money laundering and the financing of crime and terror, with the benefit of full diplomatic cover. The sad truth is that this initiative was undermined by agencies with a vested interest in the status quo.

The extent to which it is feasible to control extreme threats to security by conventional policing is a debate that has existed, at least since the Roman Republic. For a variety of reasons, but in the main resulting from the inability of traditional police agencies to adapt, whether as a result of institutionalisation, resources or local politics, over the last decade the real battle against international organised crime and especially terror has moved firmly and irreversibly into the realm of the special and traditionally defence orientated intelligence and security organisations. Whether this is simply a result of the recognition of the practical limits of traditional prosecution-based enforcement, or simply that intelligence and security organisations have found new markets, remains to be seen. The transfer of responsibility from police to organisations that have rather more limited and focussed concerns has implications far beyond those related to efficacy.

The more sophisticated intelligence agencies have always been concerned about money flows and financial intelligence. However, it is relatively recently that so much investment has gone into this area. In an organisation such as MI6 30 years ago, this sort of work was the preserve of perhaps no more than five full time employees, today, it is hard to find anyone who is not – at least labelled, as a financial expert! Indeed, there is almost a scramble to be recognised as having the competence to operate financial intelligence capture and deployment. The interesting aspect of this process is the way in which the boundaries between organised crime and terrorism have become blurred. SOCA while obviously having a role, by law if perhaps not entirely by aspiration, has in the view of some not been involved to the extent that one would think. Indeed, the defence intelligence community has seen an opportunity – not only for longevity but also survival and grabbed it.

In fact much has been initiated with the direct support of the present government and in particular the Ministry of Defence, but as is so often the case, the successes that have been achieved have been “unsung”. The opposition, perhaps soon to become a new government, would like to see a National Security Council co-ordinating these somewhat ad hoc initiatives and in particular bestowing a far more meaningful role on the Foreign Office and a better utilisation of its international assets. It is not entirely clear that this would be welcome either in the FCO proper, let alone the SIS. It really all comes down to the utility of intelligence and perhaps more importantly the responsibility of those who history recognises as its possessors. There have been several recent very successful overseas operations involving the disruption of significant amounts of funding to terrorist and terrorist related activities, indeed, one such operation in South India facilitated the defeat of the Tamil Tigers. However, there have also been embarrassments. While this is not the opportunity to comment on the complexities of information capture let alone those associated with the processing of intelligence for tactical disruption, there are indications that reliance on the co-operation of those within the financial sector may become problematic. Exposure to legal and regulatory risk has been accepted as proportionate in addressing real and identifiable criminality – but the more we push the envelope to tax, corruption, embargoed regimes and the like – and resort to procedures characterised by the vagaries of disruption as opposed to the relatively defined processes of traditional prosecution, the more fragile will become this crucial relationship. The more so when it is morally clear that certain legal and regulatory devices are in reality Trojan horses – if not be design, by adaption!

There is a danger in the simple world in which we live in of confusing roles and perhaps more significantly responsibilities. This is problem (a very real one) for those given the job to do – but also a much wider and serious one for those who are concerned with such notions as the rule of law and the balance of power between the individual and the state.

Let us hope that whatever a new government does do, it keeps at least some “blue water” between the spooks and the police – let alone those engaged in development aid.

Barry Rider