Nuclear Disarmament: Regional Perspectives on Progress: Volume 21

This chapter is in two parts. Part I is an analysis of the efforts made by India to promote Nuclear Disarmament. Part II discussse the recent global efforts towards Nuclear Disarmament and India’s evolving stand towards it along with a note on what could be done in coming years to make Nuclear Disarmament a reality.

Is the nuclear sky falling? It appears so. With the quantitative and qualificative improvements in nuclear stockpile, a proliferation-pessimism finds expression in metaphors about nuclear dominoes, chains etc. With a number of threshold states, the catch-phrase is ‘credible deterrence’. However, much of the zero-sum cold war thinking on strategic defence has now become anachronistic. A phased adaptive approach, leading to universal disarmament is necessary, especially in India’s strategic interest. A nuclear weapon-free world could ensure a safer regional security environment for India. It’s all the more imperative in view of China’s interest to emerge as the strategic leader in Asia, even well beyond Asia.

New START initiatives are positive developments in this regard. However, it is necessary to bring into this fold other nuclear powers. (China has rejected the US and Russian levels of nuclear ‘transparency’ as part of its defence calculus; it has already crossed the multiple warhead Rubicon. It may also install a National Missile Defence System by 2020.)

Though a Nuclear Weapon-Free World (NWFW) cannot emerge instantaneously, an NWFW can evolve, if the following measures are evolved:

• (i)

  Change the mind-set devaluing nuclear weapons by strategically displacing ‘disbelief’ with ‘faith’ in the efficacy of nuclear abolition.

• (ii)

  Change the perception of  the utility and prestige associated with nuclear weapons.

• (iii)

  Redraft nuclear doctrines to restrict their role and break the ‘feed-back paradigm of the need for nuclear deterrence’.

• (iv)

  Take measures to build confidence in multilateral initiation on NWFW.

• (v)

  Ensure universal acceptance of ‘no first use’ (NFU) through a legally binding, universally accepted agreement.

• (vi)

  Have agreement prohibiting the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.

• (vii)

  Devise agreements for controlling the continuous qualitative upgradation.

• (viii)

  Establishment of a Safeguard Regime with thorough organizational and institutional mechanism.

• (ix)

  Use advanced surveillance and monitoring technology to ensure compliance.

• (x)

  Implement effective enforcement strategy to penalize delinquent.

Change the mind-set devaluing nuclear weapons by strategically displacing ‘disbelief’ with ‘faith’ in the efficacy of nuclear abolition.

Change the perception of  the utility and prestige associated with nuclear weapons.

Redraft nuclear doctrines to restrict their role and break the ‘feed-back paradigm of the need for nuclear deterrence’.

Take measures to build confidence in multilateral initiation on NWFW.

Ensure universal acceptance of ‘no first use’ (NFU) through a legally binding, universally accepted agreement.

Have agreement prohibiting the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.

Devise agreements for controlling the continuous qualitative upgradation.

Establishment of a Safeguard Regime with thorough organizational and institutional mechanism.

Use advanced surveillance and monitoring technology to ensure compliance.

Implement effective enforcement strategy to penalize delinquent.

It is in India’s interest to pursue universal disarmament with universal focus on economic and social cohesion for war prevention as the key to long-term security.

As the first Asian country to build a nuclear reactor, and as one among the handful of countries with full nuclear fuel cycle capabilities, India should strive to bring about universal disarmament of nuclear weapons so that world can meet spiralling demand for power through nuclear reactors, which pose no threat to the world peace.

This chapter analyses the linkage between disarmament and global security. Traditional notion of security has changed dramatically in the 21st century. The attention of the world community has shifted from the security of the state to the security of the people. When the idea of an independent Commission for Human Security was launched at the 2000 UN Millennium Summit, there was a general agreement on the importance of ensuring freedom from want and freedom from fear. There is a new breed of threats to human and ecological security in the form of terrorist attacks and they may acquire nuclear weapons. Nuclear terrorism is a grave threat to global security. There is also a fear that the existing UN mechanism to halt nuclear arms race and proliferation of nuclear weapons is inadequate as all countries have not signed the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), and the division between nuclear haves and nuclear have-nots is a major hurdle in the creation of the nuclear non-proliferation regime.

India faces a critical phase of its post-independence existence with an alarming besiege of hostile states and violent non-state actors. The existential security predicament has emerged in an irony that features India’s steady and solid economic growth and development. Despite the robustness of the economic and strategic macro-fundamentals, India is in the throes of a critical siege of violent asymmetric conflict in a South Asian region besieged by state-failure and economic fatigue. A United States and allied strategic dilemmas vacillate in Afghanistan, a Pakistan in the throes of a new round of critical internal destabilisation with a massive spurt in radicalisation threatening to engulf the Afghanistan–Pakistan region and a China that exploits India’s unsettled boundary issues leveraging support to Pakistan, all present India its double jeopardy.

The employ of the term ‘Double-Jeopardy’ is a legalistic term that connotes that a person cannot be penalised twice for the same crime. The employ of ‘Double-Jeopardy’ in this analysis reflects India’s existential threats of violent asymmetric conflict and its pathological consequences and the perilous impact of nuclear weapons associated with such groups and their state sponsors.

This chapter endeavours to examine (a) India’s critical security vulnerabilities and responses emergent from the worsening Afghanistan–Pakistan situation; (b) the consequences of a US retreat from Afghanistan and the Chinese assertive rise in the South Asian region; (c) critical imperatives and operational safeguards in India’s nuclear security; and (d) future pathways of India in the region.

The deal on civil nuclear cooperation between India and the United States had an immense global implication on account of its centrality to the contemporary concerns on nuclear proliferation. Much of the debate centered around four critical arguments: first, by amending US nonproliferation laws for India as an exception outside the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) framework, the deal would weaken the fundamental goal of US nonproliferation policy – to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons beyond the five recognized nuclear weapon states (NWS) under the NPT. Second, why should other states stay in the treaty regime if a nonmember gets the benefits without much of responsibilities? Third, the problems of nuclear proliferation would multiply in the face of current challenges posed by North Korea and Iran. Lastly, the nonproliferation lobbyists were apprehensive that the US–India cooperation could prompt other suppliers, like China, to validate their nuclear cooperation with Pakistan. In view of these arguments it is important to assess whether these arguments are merely debating points or exaggerated concerns or do they hold any strong basis for contention.

This chapter justifies India’s acquisition of nuclear weapons on the basis of an ancient Roman dictum: Si vis pacem, para bellum, which means, ‘if you want peace, prepare for war’. However, Indian leaders were far more imbued with idealism than realism. Nehru’s successors were not able to overcome Nehru’s idealistic commitment to use nuclear technology for peaceful purposes alone.

However, the government led by the BJP changed Indian nuclear policy by conducting five nuclear tests in May 1998 and declaring India as a Nuclear Weapons State (NWS). India also came out with its nuclear doctrine.

This chapter discusses the basic principles of the Indian nuclear doctrine. Though there are several principles of the doctrine, only such principles which have a bearing on the ultimate goal of achieving nuclear disarmament are discussed in this chapter. India has pledged not to use nuclear weapons ‘against states which do not possess nuclear weapons, or are not aligned’ with other NWS. India adheres to the concept of no first use (NFU) of nuclear weapons. This is the heart of the nuclear doctrine. The principle of NFU says that the nation would resort to the use of nuclear weapons only as a weapon of self-defence and only in a second strike.

India as a reluctant NWS has also committed its nuclear doctrine to ‘global, verifiable and non-discriminatory nuclear disarmament’ as a national security objective. Indian nuclear doctrine is conducive in promoting nuclear disarmament. The chapter also proposes an international treaty around NFU as a first step towards nuclear disarmament.

Nuclear disarmament has been a matter of great policy concern for Russia as it was for the former Soviet Union. To recall briefly, super power rivalry between the former Soviet Union and the United States was deeply entrenched even in the field of nuclear issue for about five decades as a form of offensive and defensive policy instrument. Fully realizing and acknowledging the high risk involved in the event of a nuclear war for themselves and for the world as a whole, both the superpowers were sensible and responsible enough to avoid such an eventuality. As more countries joined the nuclear race subsequently, there was growing realization of the need to launch the campaign for nuclear disarmament on a global scale. In this background an effort has been made in this chapter to understand and analyze Russia’s perspectives and initiatives on the issue of nuclear disarmament.

Nuclear proliferation has become a global phenomenon since 1945. A debate has emerged about whether the nuclear nonproliferation regime is sufficient to contain nuclear proliferation. Nuclear proliferation regime has confronted new challenges in recent times. Developments stemming from the demise of the former USSR have raised few serious problems: a previously acknowledged nuclear weapon state had been subjected to political disintegration. This was a period of nuclear transformation which required long-term cooperation between Russia and the United States. This period of transition was facilitated by the foresight of policymakers from both sides of the former cold war divide and by the frameworks of arms control and disarmament agreements then in place. Ensuring nuclear stability during this period was possible because of agreements like the NPT and START.

However, the other side of the story is that in January 2000, the Russian Government released its new nuclear policy in a document entitled: “Concept of National Security” which was ratified by Presidential decree on April 21, 2000. The document was updated version of policy statements made in 1993 and 1997, and indicated a heightened sense of conflict with NATO and the United States on nuclear issues, and an increased reliance on nuclear weapons. Russia rejected to adhere to the “no-first-use” of nuclear weapons policy.

Russia’s nuclear policy under Putin entered a period of new realism. Russia was presented as an alternative pole to the West which gave way to new arms race. Therefore the initiative toward nuclear disarmament would most likely be largely cosmetic in nature. This chapter attempts to present a theoretical framework on Russia’s nuclear disarmament policy since early 1990s.

Comprehensive nuclear disarmament which has been traditionally regarded as an idealistic and unachievable objective in the foreseeable future is now receiving greater attention from all quarters including major countries, statesmen and international NGOs. In fact, recent initiative for a nuclear-free world came from four well-known US political figures namely George Schultz, Henry Kissinger, Sam Nunn and William Perry. Though the process towards nuclear disarmament seems long, arduous and extremely complicated, it is, no doubt, emerging as the primary mission of the international community. In today’s world many think that a nuclear weapon free world is achievable; an optimism, probably, generated by the end of Cold War politics. However, the objective of this chapter is not to map the contours of global nuclear disarmament but to limit to a discussion on European remedies, if any, for Russian nuclear disarmament.

The threat posed by nuclear weapons to world peace need not be exaggerated. Advancement in science and technology has enabled us to go for a complete annihilation of not only the Homo sapiens but all the species on earth. Should we permit our idiocy entangled with the nuclear weapons to destroy us or should we, the thinking animals, permit our wisdom to outlive the demonic nuclear weapons, is a question that is being asked by sensible people all over the world today. Just public denouncement of weapons of mass destruction is un-utilitarian. Mankind has been hearing such hollow, absurd words ever since the first atomic test. We have been feeding ourselves on a diet of hypocrisy. If it is not that what else is CTBT? Should the world permit demons to chant mantra? Isn’t it time to recognize that the world is governed not by saints but by Satans? (This is because rise and fall of civilizations has taught us that might is still right.) Isn’t it time to understand that only a metamorphosis of the Satans into saints can save the world? If we know that well, we should start thinking how the nuclear Satans could be transformed into nuclear saints and it is only logical that the nuke Satans should take initiative in transforming themselves, which alone would salvage the world. The present study is premised on these assumptions.

By the end of World War II, the world witnessed both military and peaceful uses of nuclear science. A number of countries and different sections of the international community strongly urged to avoid repetition of the devastation witnessed in Hiroshima and Nagasaki. A world without nuclear weapons was a subject matter of not only pacifists but also of a large section of the world. The 2010 RevCon was held from 3 to 28 May 2010. The final document noted: ‘… the reaffirmation by the nuclear-weapon states of their unequivocal undertaking to accomplish, in accordance with the principle of irreversibility, the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals leading to nuclear disarmament, to which all States parties are committed under article VI of the Treaty’. The 2010 RevCon also welcomed ‘the new proposals and initiatives from Governments and civil society related to achieving a world free of nuclear weapons’. Indeed, Obama, during his election campaign, spoke on the need for nuclear disarmament. So, should we conclude that global nuclear disarmament would materialize soon? What is the reality? If we take into account signals emitting from the postures and pronouncements of the nuclear weapons countries of the NPT and the influential section of the global civil society, we may find that global nuclear disarmament is somewhere between myth and super myth. A reality check would indicate that global nuclear disarmament would continue to elude us.

The chapter describes the development of and rationale for the undeclared Israeli nuclear posture. It analyzes the relevance and irrelevance of the nuclear component in Israel’s overall deterrence posture and considers its contribution to Israel’s security. While Israel is assumed to be a nuclear power, its ambiguous nuclear posture makes her a special case. Moreover, the ambiguous posture is important diplomatically and also as an arms control measure. Israel’s position on nuclear arms control is presented and analyzed in this chapter. Israel supports the idea of a MEWMDFZ but insists that this could come about only after peace agreements are signed with all the regional states and a period of time elapses to assess the validity of these agreements. Beyond that, Israel is party to several other arms control agreements, which are described in this chapter.

The author then proceeds to raise several ideas about possible arms control measures that might enhance regional stability while not adversely affecting Israel’s security. These comprise the following: first, ratification of the CTBT which Israel signed but has not ratified. Second, Israeli acceptance of the FMCT if and when this treaty is internationally enacted. Several considerations are presented concerning the implications of this treaty, including – among others – the effect on Israel’s ambiguous nuclear posture. Third, adoption of a doctrine of “no first use.” The pro and con arguments on the advisability of such a step are assessed. These include – among others – the possible effects on different types of deterrence against Iran, if the latter becomes nuclear, as well as the overall stability of regional nuclear balances. The issue of Israeli deterrence against the use of other types of WMD is also assessed. Fourth, the article calls for the creation of a new forum for regional security in which regional states would participate, similar but not necessarily identical to ACRS.

The position of France – President Nicolas Sarkozy reiterated the French nuclear doctrine in a speech in Cherbourg. For the first time, a French president dealt at length with the problems of disarmament. He also clarified the French position: Paris has always been doubtful about the “Global Zero” level advocated by some other countries.

Under President Jacques Chirac another element was added: the force de frappe could be used against the leadership of states that use terrorism against France as well as those that envisage using weapons of mass destruction. In addition to the vital interests of the French nation, “the interests of nations allied to France” consacrated a first step toward a common European policy in nuclear matters.

From the beginning of the Fifth Republic (1958) till today, there has been a wide consensus on defense issues, particularly on the force de frappe. Even the Socialists under Mitterrand rallied to the necessity of a policy of deterrence; the Communists, though proponents of total nuclear disarmament, did not oppose it.

The position of European Union – However, the European Union has worked on strategy policies on subjects such as the Union action plan on chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear security; nuclear nonproliferation; European security strategy; etc.

The European Union consists of two nuclear states and 25 nonnuclear states. It makes it difficult to find a unified approach toward disarmament. Despite the Treaty of Lisbon and the creation of post of a high representative for foreign affairs and security policy, the European Union struggles to define a common foreign policy.

This chapter is an attempt to review the New START Treaty and put forward the perspectives and prospects. The chapter outlines certain assumptions that should be kept in mind for the success of arms control based upon the findings therein. This point about arms race should be obvious, but is often ignored although the need for arms control can never be undermined.

The prime issue in Russo–American relations – apart from economic and political reforms – remains arms' control (or nuclear security). Both nuclear superpowers wish to reduce and/or redeploy forces for reasons of cost and effectiveness, and the signing of the new Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty that builds on a previous agreement is an important step. Both sides have deep incentives to cooperate as they share common concerns on one hand and yet their interests differ owing to different force postures and perceived threats giving rise to an inequality of interest on the other.

The New START Treaty is not just about Washington and Moscow. It is about the entire world community. While the treaty is bilateral, it has big implications for global security. The United States and Russia control more than 90% of the world’s nuclear arsenal, and the world looks to these two countries for leadership in securing nuclear materials globally and preventing the spread of nuclear weapons. Thus, the new Treaty sets the stage for engaging other powers in fulfilling the goals of the Nuclear Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and the chapter examines the issues concerning the fallout of the New START Treaty.

Walter Lippmann in his 1922 classic “Public Opinion” noted that “the news media are a primary source of those pictures in our heads about the larger world of public affairs, a world that for most citizens is “out of reach, out of sight, out of mind.” Indeed, among the different roles that the mass media performs is one of an information provider and interpreter of world events and policy decisions. The power of the mass media to mould public opinion on issues of national and international significance is well documented. Our knowledge and priorities about public affairs are based on what the media decides to feed us with. In this context, the present chapter seeks to analyze the crucial role essayed by the mass media in ensuring human security by promoting favorable public opinion toward the cause of nuclear nonproliferation and disarmament. S. Rashid Naim enunciates in “Nuclear Proliferation in South Asia” that a nuclear attack between India and Pakistan even limiting itself to military targets would cause approximately 577,000 deaths in Pakistan and 604,000 deaths in India apart from substantial number of injuries and destruction of property. The knowledge about this impending havoc should reach the grassroots level and this can be accomplished only by the mass media. With global efforts being channelized toward nonproliferation of nuclear weapons, the media and its trend-setting abilities can be harnessed to enlighten the average public about the disasters of a nuclear war. As the role of the mass media becomes more prominent in managing conflicts all over the world, the time is ripe to utilize its immense powers to dilute the level of possible nuclear clashes. A more proactive role of the media is envisioned through the establishment of a “global communication center” dedicated to the publication and broadcast of information advocating the cause of total nuclear disarmament. This center will be the locus of information dissemination and advocacy directed toward nations that possess nuclear weapons and those that are likely to get their hands on them in the near future. While the mass media is certainly not the only actor in the process of nuclear disarmament, it can be a decisive force for nations to choose between “atom for peace” or “atom for war.”

Valedictory comments by Dr. S. K. Behera, Joint Secretary Policy Planning and Research on the Seminar on ‘Nuclear Disarmament: Global Steps Towards Human Security’ on 22nd December 2010.