Cognitive Aids in Strategy: Volume 6

In this chapter, we reflect on cognitive aids and their role in strategy work. Strategy research and practice abound with frameworks, models, tools, and processes meant to describe and guide the strategy work of managers. These are all examples of cognitive aids. These aids guide and support managerial cognition, the way managers make sense of the world. What we collectively call the cognitive aids of strategy have a profound impact on the way managers learn about, conceptualize, share, and enact strategy work and strategies in their organizations. Despite the importance of their cognitive role, many cognitive aids in strategy are presented without reference to the underlying cognitive theory that explains why and how the aid might be useful. Tools are presented as useful for management thinking, but without any substantive reflection or exploration of the cognitive reasons. In this chapter, we provide a definition of cognitive aids in strategy and begin exploring the landscape of cognitive theories that can explain why something might be a cognitive aid. We then briefly outline the contributions to the edited volume “Cognitive Aids in Strategy,” and end with an invitation to expand your exploration beyond.

Why is it that highly trained and seasoned executives fail? On the surface, this doesn’t make sense because they are very successful; yet research in the organization sciences provides no shortage of evidence to prove just that. From the classic Mann Gulch fire disaster of Weick’s famous collapse of sensemaking study, to studies of myopia of learning, escalation of commitment, threat-rigidity, dominant logic, the architecture of simplicity, the Icarus Paradox, to core competencies turning into core rigidities, and navigating new competitive markets using “old” cognitive maps, and many more such examples point to a ubiquitous phenomenon where highly trained and experienced professionals find themselves “stuck” in the heat of battle, unable to move and progress. On the one hand, for some, there is a desperate need for change, but are unable to do so, due to their trained incapacities. On the other hand, some simply cannot see the need for change, and continue with their “business as usual” mentality. For both, their visions of the world shrink, they have a tendency to cling onto their past habitual practices and oversimplify the complexity of the situation. In moments like these: DROP YOUR TOOLS and UNLEARN! This book chapter introduces a framework (grounded in clinical psychology) that has had consistent success in helping seasoned executives and key decision-makers open up the alternatives whenever they find themselves stuck with complexity.

Traditionally, the main goal of empirical research has been to test theories. Yet, theory-testing is problematical in the social sciences. Findings from empirical studies have proven hard to replicate and there is a lack of progress in creating a coherent and cumulative knowledge base. There are both practical and epistemological issues that prevent effective empirical tests. It is difficult to operationalize constructs and design decisive tests of theories. The laws and regularities posited in theories in the natural sciences are independent of human actors, while theories in the social sciences describe systems and structures that are created and maintained by human actors. Nonetheless, human actors are sometimes guided by theories. They may change their behavior or make different decisions based on academically produced knowledge. This relationship is usually mediated by the use of tools of various sorts (i.e., design principles, diagrams, or stories). I discuss why scholars should conduct empirical research to test the pragmatic validity of tools that are derived from theories rather than testing the scientific validity of the theories themselves.

As one of the most influential theories in strategic management, Hambrick and Mason’s Upper Echelons Theory has yielded significant conceptual and empirical advancements linking executive characteristics and perceptions to decision-making. Specifically, work on this theory consistently shows that CEOs’ decisions are biased by personal characteristics to the benefit and detriment of firms. While this stream of research links executive decision processes to outcomes such as executive dismissals, analyst evaluations, and press coverage, surprisingly little is understood about if and whether the information CEOs convey is subject to the same filtering process by a firm’s key evaluators. Thus, in this chapter, we aim to extend Upper Echelons Theory by positing that a double filtering process occurs whereby the cognitive aids CEOs use can be informed by not only their cognitive base and values but also the characteristics and priorities of those who evaluate the nonverbal and verbal signals they send. To do so, we build on recent conceptual and empirical advancements to make a case for the decision-making biases and tendencies that influence signal interpretation by three key evaluator groups internal and external to the firm: boards of directors, financial analysts, and the media. We conclude by considering the implications of evaluators’ information filtering and how this more holistic view of Upper Echelons decision-making can enable executive teams to be strategic with the cognitive aids they use to influence evaluations.

Scenarios are cognitive aids for thinking about the future in a sustained and disciplined manner. Because scenarios must be facilitated, scenarios must be considered in the context of their practice. In the strategic management literature, there has been a considerable conversation on the practical difference between “hot” and “cold” cognition. Thinking in this conventional literature demonstrates how the facilitators of scenario planning workshops establish and channel the productive cognition of their clients away from hot cognition and toward cold cognition. But how? As a thought experiment, we examine whether the sociological concept of “emotional labor” helps explain the cognition management of clients by facilitators during scenario planning. We end by considering how a deeper practical understanding of emotional labor might help facilitators identify mechanisms and adapt their tools to better manage the cognitive-affective dimensions of scenario planning in practice.

This chapter dwells on the use of music as a metaphorical tool to help organisations grapple with the intricacies of working within an environment that is unstable and more and more prone to rapid changes and the subsequently induced alteration of company focus and direction. This is not to say that strategic planning or delivery is musical but to provide the reader with a distinct and intriguing cognitive aid. Three types of music are considered (classical orchestral, popular music (pop), and jazz). Each metaphor helps to reveal alternative approaches to leadership but more specifically strategic development. This is, moreover, not offered as a template for success just the building of possibilities by using music as a different lens through which to scrutinise the strategic field. Areas highlighted in this reflective chapter are the role music can play to help understand the role of staff collaboration and learning. In addition, an understanding of the ways in which humans remember and relate to dynamic organisational life and the need for anchor-points to help with memory. Music provides both the possibilities of collaboration and soloing, or, put in another way, leadership, and followership as well as the ways in which listening, unlearning and collaboration aid the development of a more emergent, flexible dynamic organisational strategic development and policy.

Improving a startup’s ability to obtain funding is critical to the survival of the organization. Although existing studies have observed various biases in investment decisions, few have studied the neural mechanisms behind such behavioral observations. We propose to apply cutting-edge neuroscientific techniques to uncover the neural processes engaged during pitches by entrepreneurs to investors and to use this new knowledge to identify strategy artifacts promoting pitch success. We hypothesize that pitches are dynamically shaped by covert cognitive, emotional, and social processes, which are in turn influenced by tactical approach (story-telling vs dry facts), physical context (online vs in-person), and demographics (gender, ethnicity). The role of inter-brain synchrony (i.e., correlation of cortical activity between brains) – within the startup team or between the entrepreneurs and investors – in pitch outcomes remains unknown. By uncovering the covert processes that mediate pitch outcomes, we provide an evidence-based, scientific approach to improving pitch success.

Artifacts are rarely used today to visualize thoughts, insights, and ideas in strategy work. Rather, textual and verbal communication dominates. This is despite artifacts and visual representations holding many advantages as tools to create and make sense of strategy in teamwork. To advance our understanding of the benefits of visual aids in strategy work, I synthesize insights from cognitive psychology, neuroscience, and management research. My analysis exposes distinct neurocognitive advantages concerning attention, emotion, learning, memory, intuition, and creativity from visual sense-building. These advantages increase when sense-building activities are playful and storytelling is used.

This chapter wants to understand under which circumstances and conditions non-traditional aids are effective in the strategic process. This study builds an agent-based computational simulation model – the S-uFUNK 2.1.0 – to explore the research question. The model features a group of managers that seeks to interpret environmental cues using both traditional and non-traditional tools. When interpretations converge, the group then settles on different focus areas to define a business strategy for their organization. The process is set in a way such that 11 parameters can be manipulated to explore the different conditions under which non-traditional aids are of use. Results suggest that non-traditional aids differ from traditional aids only in limited circumstances and that social dynamics and dispositions within the group are crucial. In general, the simulation helps us reflect on the way in which we consider traditional aids to strategy. In fact, if they are no different than non-traditional aids, their effectiveness is directly challenged.