Altruistic preferences

, 110

Appropriable quasi-rents (AQRs)

, 106

Arrow–Pratt measure of risk aversion

, 194–195

Assumptions in transaction cost economics

, 109

Babbling equilibrium

, 20–21, 25, 33

Benchmark contract

, 48

Bias

, 23, 32–33

Bonds

, 46

Bonus

, 42

Bureaucracy in the United States

, 128

“Catch” trials

, 26

Charity

, 136–137

Coding messages

, 4

Communication

, 5–6

message sophistication

, 31–32

Compensating differentials

, 182–183

Compensation schemes

competition and

, 160

cooperation and

, 160

fixed pay

, 193

piece rate

, 161, 167, 169, 172, 173, 216

tournament

, 161, 162, 173, 175, 179

Confidence bias

, 178

Constraint

comp

, 43

incentive comp

, 43

non-distribution

, 43

participation

, 50

Consumer surplus

, 86

Contracts

, 146–148

Credence goods

, 43

Delegation

, 142, 153, 155

Dictator games

, 4

Direct effect of feedback on wages

, 12–13

Disapproval and gratitude

, 8

Donors Forums

, 86

Ex-ante inefficiency

, 107–108, 119–121

EXOGENOUS HIGH and EXOGENOUS LOW

, 236–239

Experience goods

, 43

Ex-post inefficiency

, 107–108, 119–121

Gender differences

, 179–180

Gift-exchange games

, 2

bilateral

, 4–6

Governmental oversight

, 86, 88

Group identity

, 107

developing

, 111–112

favoritism

, 106

minimal group paradigm

, 122n4

Incentives

extrinsic

, 190

financial

, 190–191

intensity

, 191

intrinsic

, 190

risk and

, 191

Incentive to free ride

, 230–231

Individual characteristics

, 165

Indonesian Public Service

, 134, 137, 138n6

Indonesian Red Cross Society (IRCS)

, 128, 130, 134, 136

Inefficiency

ex-ante

, 107–108, 119–121

ex-post

, 107–108, 119–121

Information networks

, 268

Information spillovers

, 266–269

Information transmission

, 32–33

Inputs-based (IBs) funding

, 40, 48–49

piece-rate

, 70–71

wage and piece-rate

, 42

Inter-generational spillovers

, 268

Knowledge spillovers

, 268–269

Kyoho-kai

, 107

Learning

, 241

Level-k model for

, 23–24, 33–35

Locus of control

, 148–149

Manager wage decisions

, 9–14

Mission-matching

, 128

Monitoring in principal-agent settings

, 143

Nash equilibrium

, 96–98

New Zealand Experimental Economics Laboratory (NZEEL)

, 110

Not-for-profit sectors

, 40, 44, 47

Organizational identification

, 106–107

Pay-for-performance (pfp), incentive effect of

, 190–191, 195

Payoffs

, 23, 26, 29–30, 33

Performance-based (PBs) funding

, 40

Performance-based incentive scheme

, 193

Performance-contingent incentives

, 190, 216

Peterborough Prison pilot funding scheme

, 46

Piece rate

, 166–167

Pittsburgh Experimental Economics Laboratory (PEEL)

, 145

Power-to-take game

, 3–4, 7

Prosocial behavior

, 128

Prosocial organizations

, 128

ways to attract prosocial workers

, 129

Prosocial preferences

charity

, 136–137

design

, 130–133

measurement

, 130–131

selection effects and selection bias

, 131

social spillovers

, 271–272

Ranking distribution

, 172

Relation-specific investment

, 106

Relative performance

, 178

Revealed Altruism theory

, 109

Revenue sharing

, 161, 168–169

Risk aversion

, 192

elicitation

, 148, 149, 200

preferences

, 200

Robustness check

, 181–182

Second-order effect

, 92

Selection effects and selection bias, interpreting

, 131

Self-confidence

, 167–168

Self-regarding preferences

, 108

Self-regulatory organizations (SROs)

, 86

Sender-receiver game

, 20, 22–25

Social distance

, 273

Social Finance

, 41

Social identity theory

, 106, 122n4

Social impact bonds (SIBs)

, 40, 45–46

behavioural implications

, 72–73

design of

, 63–66

Social preferences

, 165–166, 179

Social psychology

, 122n5

Social spillovers

, 253, 270–275

individual characteristics and peer effects

, 273–274

pure peer effects

, 271–272

social distance and

, 273

structure of the interaction

, 274–275

within and between teams

, 272–273

Spillovers

classification of

, 252

impact on firm productivity

, 263–264

informational

, 266–269

inter-generational

, 268

knowledge

, 268–269

social

, 253, 270–275

team-based incentives, effects of

, 263

technological

, 253–270

Strategic procrastination

, 234–236

ENDOGENOUS treatments

, 241–246

Strategy method

, 113–114

Structured emotion expression, use of

, 8–9

Subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium

, 92, 96, 98

Taiwan Social Science Experiment Laboratory (TASSEL)

, 25–35

Team-production environments

, 230

Technological spillovers

, 253–270

incentives and

, 262–266

information and

, 266–270

information networks and

, 268

production functions relating to workers

, 259–262

in semiconductor industry

, 268–269

Time trend and attrition

, 239–241

Tournament

, 169

individual

, 161, 162, 169, 173, 174, 175, 178, 179, 181

team

, 161, 169, 175, 179, 180

Toyota Motor Corporation

, 107

Two-player sequential game

, 4–6

Communication and No Communication

, 5–6

Ultimatum game

, 2

Uncertainty

, 196–198

Wage

, 42

Within-subject studies

, 154

Work-related stress

, 197

World Values Survey (WVS)

, 129

Zipper matching algorithm

, 6

z-Tree (Zurich Toolbox for Readymade Economic Experiments)

, 25