Prelims

Anti-Communism: A Transition to Authoritarianism

Following the independence from Japanese colonialism and the devastating Korean War of 1950–1953, Korean society under President Syngman Rhee was caught up in diverse philosophical polemics that ranged from communism to liberalism. In the aftermath of the official day of liberalization, that is, August 15, 1945, the Korean peninsula was soon put under the influence of a concurrent flow of utopian philosophies which in fact often highlighted the stark reality of the war-ridden nation: diverging political factions included nationalists, socialists, pro-American factions (under the guidance of President Rhee himself), pro-Japanese factions, and many others (Kwon, 1998: 173).

The fact that post-independence Korea had witnessed a sudden outflow of political ideologies that can be proved by the sheer number of newborn political parties upon Independence Day. In March 1946, Korea had total of 134 political parties and social factions, and the number increased to 350 in 1947. Among the newborn parties, however, there were a significant number of pseudo-parties as well, which basically were interest-driven cliques centered on a few charismatic individuals (Kim, 2006: 69). In sum, the political climate during this period can be understood more as a sudden outpour of parochial opportunistic ideologies rather than a birth of political factions with a firm basis in philosophical perspectives.

Dr. Rhee (President Rhee received a doctoral degree in political science from Princeton during his stay in the United States) was not very different from his counterparts, as he was more of an action-driven politician than a philosopher (Jeong, 2003: 179). Although President Rhee had a unique combination of international and scholarly upbringing as he spent many years in the United States, his administration often gets labeled as one-person authoritarianism (Han, 1981: 29), which then highlights an apparent absence of governing philosophy throughout his regime.

However, the fact that President Rhee’s governing philosophy lacked contents does not mean that his administration lacked all substance. In fact, President Rhee himself had a firm belief in anti-communism (Jeong, 2003: 179). President Rhee’s firm insistence on anti-communism was a decisive factor in cancelling-out even the slightest possibility of political cooperation across the ideological spectrum (Lee, 1989: 327–328). President Rhee’s anti-communism policies served as a practical raison d’etre of Korea’s First Republic, which gained even stronger momentum as anti-communism fervor swept the southern half of the Peninsula following the 4.3 Rebellion and Yeosu-Suncheon Rebellion of 1948, and finally, the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950 (Jeong, 2003: 181). It was due to such circumstances that Korea’s liberal democracy during its First Republic phase could not overcome its limitation as it was effectively used as a disguise for granting legitimacy to President Rhee’s iron-clad rule over the populace.

From an economic perspective, President Rhee had a strong proclivity toward free-market capitalism, which can be traced back to his past 40 years of residency in the United States (Yoo & Lee, 1997). In the aftermath of the establishment of the government of the Republic of Korea, public officials soon engaged in active discussions and dialogs on different choices among a centralized planning economy, free-market capitalism, the ratio of state-owned enterprises to private firms, and so forth (Kim, 2006: 91). Although Korea was experiencing severe economic hardship, President Rhee’s economic philosophy, which showed high similarity to that of the United States insisted on minimizing the intervention of government over the market. However, President Rhee’s economic drives lacked specific directions and deliverables, whereas the overall Korean economy did not have enough public infrastructure or social background for important policy, which in fact led to confusion and poverty.

From a social perspective, Korea under President Rhee was under an abysmal situation. Following the three decades of Japanese colonial rule and an all-out-war on the Peninsula, Korea was experienced extreme social fragmentation. Concerning such dire circumstances, one of President Rhee’s policies was to emphasize education. From the very onset of the First Republic, the Rhee Administration secured people’s right to education on the Constitution of 1948, and stipulated a six-year mandatory education on the Education Act of 1949. President Rhee’s education drive was an all-out effort against the limits of schools, classrooms, textbooks, and teachers (Kim, 2006: 94). Numbers of institutes for higher-education grew to 62 in 1960, a remarkable increase from 31 in 1948, while the total number of pupils grew to 97,819 from 24,000 (Handerson, 1968: 170). Considering the dire socioeconomic circumstance that the Rhee Administration inherited, the President’s education policy was indeed remarkable. Yet, its success cannot be misunderstood as the same level of philosophical inquires and discussions of contemporary Korea, as the nation during the 1950–1960s was under heavy stress of economic despair and underdevelopment.

Corruption and Chaos in Public Administration

During the First Republic, President Rhee was indeed an authoritarian leader, yet his administration lacked a stable political base and administrative background. This was due to the lack of philosophical contemplation on inquires such as “what is the role of public administrations” and “what constitutes an ideal form of bureaucracy.” In short, President Rhee’s tenure can be characterized as an utter absence of both political and administrative philosophy other than anti-communism.

During that time, Korea’s nemesis in Pyongyang (the capital city in North Korea) was a tangible, constant threat to the national security of the South, while leftist political factions within Korea strived for the downfall of the First Republic. Facing such threats out- and inside of the nation, however, President Rhee’s administration did not have enough capacity in national defense and policing (Lee, 1988: 303–305). This was due to the fact almost all of Korea’s public functions (e.g., administration, education, transportation, etc.) came to a complete halt as the Japanese colonial government was dissolved in 1945. Korean society was under compressed demands and aspirations for a better future, and given that such desires were kept heavily oppressed under Japanese colonialism, intra-Peninsula disputes and divisions, and devastating poverty and chaos, Korea’s lack of background capacity for administrative tasks were a serious impediment for the betterment of the populace (Kim, 1006: 87).

During the First Republic, most of the cabinet posts were filled by foreign-educated officials who had their backgrounds in the independence movement. From a dichotomous perspective of efficiency versus democracy, President Rhee’s cabinet can be labeled as the latter, as its appointments had an emphasis on representative bureaucracy. Yet, President Rhee’s cabinet can also be perceived more as politics-driven appointments than as an achievement of democracy, as representatives from numerous pro-Rhee factions, such as National Youth League, United Labor Union, and Nationalist Party for Women, were invited to participate as ministers.

Under President Rhee, it does not seem that the bureaucracy itself had conspicuous roots of governing philosophies. In fact, President Rhee had a quasi-permanent, unofficial personal network throughout his close circles and top political appointees across the bureaucracy, police, youth leagues, and party machines of the governing Liberal Party (Kim, 1991: 114). President Rhee often shuffled his cabinet-posts, through which those who were perceived as not loyal to the President or people with potential to become his future contenders were fired from their positions (Kim, 1991). President Rhee, personally, was a believer in liberal democracy, yet his governing tendency revealed a heavy presence of authoritarianism.

Through installing official governmental branches in place, the First Republic had initiated its public administration structure; yet most of the officials, from minister-level to policy practitioners, were novices in public administration, and most of public employees could not perform their tasks effectively (Kim, 2006: 87–88). As government officials lacked know-how and expertise in managing daily administrative tasks, they also could not conduct administrative reforms effectively, and most of their daily tasks and agendas were no more than a mere amalgamation of traditional administrative culture and habitual performances from the remnants of Japanese colonialism (Oh, 2007: 3). Facing the national agenda of prosecuting pro-Japanese collaborators, however, the Rhee Administration did not sort out public employees of the past Japanese colonial government. The rationale for such decision was an urgent need of trained professionals in the public sector, which led to a de facto clemency toward the collaborators (Kim, 1990: 234–235; Park, 1987: 47). This can be diagnosed as a problem originating from the absence of administrative philosophy within the newborn government.

Incompetent politics-dependent bureaucracy tends to reveal characteristics of its pre-modern traits. In this sense, public bureaucracy during the First Republic claimed active roles in financing resources for facilitating the upper echelon’s authoritarian tactics, repressive mechanisms against opposing parties and civil society, and disseminating propaganda messages in managing the government’s legitimacy over the populace (Kim, 1998: 234–235). In addition, certain branches within the bureaucracy, such as the Ministry of Internal Affairs and regional self-governance institutions, took on the role of executing illegitimate elections throughout the nation, thereby effectively bolstering President Rhee’s grip on power and the authoritarian political tactics of the ruling regime (Kim, 1991: 106).

During the latter days of the First Republic, Korea’s bureaucracy was dominated by numerous political appointees from the hardliners of the governing Liberal Party. Such politicization of the bureaucracy soon precipitated a close interaction between the administrative branch and the Liberal Party’s nationwide networks, thereby effectively controlling both the civil society and political arena of South Korea (Kim, 1990: 237; Kim, 1991: 106). In order to maintain iron-fisted suppression over the populace, the government of the First Republic soon transformed itself into a combination of centralized bureaucracy and the repressive police agencies (Kang, 1988: 7).

In sum, President Rhee’s tenure was a time of corruption and inefficiency among the nation’s professional bureaucrats who lacked long-term time-perspective and capacity in policy making. In addition, most of President Rhee’s public employees were both the inputs and products of a spoils system, thereby exacerbating the vicious cycle of their parasitic behavior on politics.

Utilitarianism Focused on Economic Development

President Park, the strongman who governed Korea for more than a decade, was a firm believer in centralized economic planning for the betterment of the nation’ material prowess. His governing philosophy was specifically centered on a nationalist sentiment through which Korea’s urgent needs for modernization and industrialization were emphasized. In this sense, he thought that Korea, as a Third-World nation, was in a particular historical stage when compared to Western states. Rather than following Western-oriented democratic institutions and governance, President Park put higher priority in generating sustainable growth momentum, even when such an approach entailed rigid top-down authoritarianism.

Witnessing the increase of popular dissent and opposition against the regime’s autocratic behaviors, President Park insisted on the principle of “democratic nationalism” that stressed democracy can only be achieved once the survival and welfare of the Korean people was granted. Clearly, President Park did not have a firm foothold in democratic ideals or values, as he ended up amending the constitution to uphold even more repressive elements and uncontrolled power for his regime.

Like President Rhee, Park was also a steadfast anti-communist. President Park perceived the period between the downfall of the First Republic and the success of his coup as an era of social chaos and turmoil. He strongly opposed ongoing discourses on national reunification as a mere tactic of North Korean sympathizers.

In contrast to his lack of political philosophy on democratic governance, President Park had a deep perspective in assessing Korea’s contemporary status as an underdeveloped nation. His strong bias toward economic modernization came from his childhood, as his family had to endure severe economic hardship and poverty. This, combined with his perception of the chaos of post-war Korea, led to Park’s continuing call for economic modernization. In this sense, his view on governance can be categorized as a strong emphasis on utilitarianism. Most of the agendas were focused on the question of how to rapidly transform the nation toward the path of material abundance, a goal for which the values of democratic governance were sacrificed.

Claiming the presidency, President Park initiated numerous economic initiatives through so-called “Five-Years Plans” on economic development. His economic policies were different from those of his predecessor, President Rhee, as Park emphasized centralized planning and control over free-market principles with minimalist approach from the government. Of course, Korea under President Park remained as a repressed society with restrictions and limitations on individual freedom in place. National mobilization through political rallies, continuing repression against the opponents, and centralized planning on socioeconomic policies were defining characteristics of President Park’s presidency.

Emphasis on Efficacy and Effectiveness: Career Civil Service System

In terms of governing and managing the widespread administration apparatus, President Park was a strong believer in efficiency and efficacy. Considering Korea’s underdeveloped status, he held a firm belief that a liberalist approach with minimalist intervention from the government was fundamentally unfit to Korean society of the 1960–1970s. His governing behaviors were more centered at initiating top-down guidance which did not necessarily entail agreement from below. Most of the time, he expected consent from the below, and suppressed any dissenting voices. During the Park era, government-led public administration gained a firm foothold upon the Korean society, thereby turning the bureaucracy into the machine of authoritarian governance from above.

As President Park emphasized efficiency and efficacy, and a culture of a modern bureaucracy in the Weberian sense appeared within the government. During the 1960s, most of Korea’s public employees had fewer experience and lower general capacity than military officers. In order to overcome widespread skill mismatch of the public sector, President Part brought in numerous military officers into the governing apparatus. Concurrently with the entrance of military officers into the public sector, President Park sought to reform the public personnel management of the government, as he sought to bring in the principles of meritocracy. Unconventional massive administrative reforms initiated during this era and the fundamental structure of Public Servants System and Administrative System still continues to this day. Career civil service system was institutionalized in Park’s era.

Extension of Utilitarianism

The Presidency of Chun Doo-Hwan was an illegitimate government as he claimed power through a military coup that was consolidated by a massacre in the city of Gwangju. Compared to the period under President Park, Chun’s presidency saw a continuing outpour of dissent and a longing for democracy. People’s anti-regime sentiment was simply too strong for President Chun to continue his predecessor’s governing philosophy based on utilitarianism. President Chun himself defined power as “source of strength that makes the impossible possible.” Clearly, President Chun believed in a clear-cut dichotomy between “us” versus “them” when faced with political resistance and opposition from the below. He even insisted that 70% of pro-democratic activists were comprised of North Korean sympathizers. He continued with his animosity toward the National Assembly by pointing out that the opposing parties did not show full consent to the ruling majority of his governing party.

Most of President Chun’s national agendas were focused on economic development, as he held firm understanding that sustaining Korea’s high growth rate is the only way that his regime could gain legitimacy. Such a heavy emphasis on economic indicators can be understood as a continuation of President Park’s insistence on centralized economic planning. In this sense, bureaucracy under President Chun’s Fifth Republic was an effective vehicle in both policy formulation as well as implementation. Yet, President Chun’s economic drive has its biggest difference from that of President Park in that the Fifth Republic sought to establish a strong market economy. This was a major deviation from President Park’s centralized bureaucracy-led economic modernization (e.g., Economic Planning Board). President Chun, a former military general, did not have deep understanding of the national economy, and he sought to delegate most of his authority on the professionalized bureaucracy on economic matters. President Chun accepted most of comments and advises from his inner circle on how to formulate appropriate economic policies throughout the 1980s.

President Chun’s iron grip over the Korean society showed a gradual downward curve throughout his seven-year tenure. In the beginning, President Chun and his cabinet showed highly inflexible attitude toward the populace, when most of “legitimate” voice against the regime was kept suppressed. Yet, as his administration gained momentum as Korea’s economic growth continued, President Chun increasingly showed some degree of leniency toward the citizens. In this sense, he can be understood as an “instrumental liberalist,” as his first and primary concern was stability of his authoritarian control over the populace. For instance, in 1982, the curfew, which was effectively in-place since the Korean War of 1950 was abolished. In 1983, police officers stopped its surveillance along university campuses.

Professionalism in Bureaucracy

President Chun emphasized professionalism in the bureaucracy. Through granting professional autonomy to the bureaucratic apparatus, President Chun could effectively achieve a number of economic goals such as the stabilization of the price index, balanced development, increased productivity, and financial liberalization. Again, the lack of political, democratic legitimacy led President Chun to open his cabinet posts to subject matter experts, and President Chun himself accepted most of policy proposals from his professionalized bureaucracy. At the same time, in order to root out corruption within the bureaucracy, he introduced various policies such as “The Registration of Property of Public Officials” and initiated the simplification of administrative procedure and the zero-base budgeting system.

Regarding noneconomic areas, the Fifth Republic entailed significant degrees of authoritarianism and corruption, as the intervention from a group of politicized military officers, Hanahoe¹, engendered a sort of patron–client relationship throughout society. With its military wing being heavily politicized, the Fifth Republic could not uphold moral values on governance. This, combined with the lack of procedural democracy throughout the seven years was one of the major weaknesses of President Chun. Although the upper echelons of the bureaucracy showed competency and effectiveness in formulating appropriate policy prescriptions, the middle-tier managers and street-level bureaucrats remained passively entangled with rampant corruption.

Democratic Experimentation?

Korea’s fervor toward democratization started to gain momentum during the latter years of the Park Chung-Hee Administration. As the nation endured seven additional years of authoritarian dictatorship under President Chun Doo-Hwan, popular dissent and frustration reached the culmination point and a massive demonstration for freedom. Facing such large-scale dissent from below, the ruling party and the administrative branch of Korea could not continue to ignore the people’s longing for democracy. In this sense, the 6.29 Declaration, which proclaimed the restoration of democratic election of Korea’s presidency, was a significant milestone that turned the historic tide away from the past oppression.

The 6.29 Declaration (June 29, 1987) was a comprehensive democratization proposal by presidential candidate Roh Tae-woo that was officially titled the “Special Declaration for Grand National Harmony and Progress Towards a Great Nation.” This is the historical declaration in the history of Korean democratization. The Declaration comprised eight points, in which Roh promised to:

1. amend the constitution to provide for the direct election of the president;

2. revise the presidential election law to ensure free candidature and genuinely competitive elections;

3. grant amnesty to political prisoners, including Kim Dae-jung;

4. protect human dignity and extend the rule of habeas corpus;

5. abolish the Basic Press Law and restore the freedom of the press;

6. strengthen local and educational autonomy;

7. move the political climate toward dialogue and compromise; and

8. achieve substantial social reform.

However, there is no evidence that reforms aimed at implementing democratization were results of President Roh’s inner beliefs or governing philosophy. Rather, it is more accurate to view the Administration’s pro-democratic policy as a strategic response to the will of the populace.

Although President Roh’s Sixth Republic was a democratically elected administration, it is rather difficult to categorize his government as having a firm with consistent philosophical branch in promoting reforms throughout the society. In this sense, most of historians and political scientists agree that his tenure was rather a time of stagnated reforms toward democratic ­consolidation.

Also from an economic perspective, President Roh lacked clear direction on policy making. His five years inside Korea’s presidential palace was beset with new challenges both from internal and external affairs, specifically surrounding Korea’s restoration of democracy. Facing such newfangled challenges, President Roh failed to provide a clear-cut strategy or mission toward the nation’s future economic direction.

On the other hand, from a sociocultural perspective, the Sixth Republic showed some limited progress. Upon inauguration, President Roh proclaimed that he would pursue two major agendas, democratic reforms and people’s unity, and asked for people’s support and cooperation. Yet, it is more accurate to view the aforementioned policy agendas as a mere rhetoric, especially when the persistent problems of inter-provincial inequality and unjust income distribution were considered. Corruption, like his predecessors, became President Roh’s biggest concern, as Roh could not control his inner circle from committing massive-scale corruption throughout his presidency. The moral hazard of the Sixth Republic meant that the President and his cabinet could not keep up their promise on implementing societal reforms against the remnants of the past years of military dictatorship. This, again, clearly shows that President Roh lacked a consistent set of governing principles for handling a diverse range of issues from democratic reforms to economic redistribution.

Bureaucracy as a Bystander? Failed Initiatives and Agendas on Reforms

The Sixth Republic’s management over its bureaucratic apparatus also revealed ineptitude in providing effective public administration. As President Roh decided to extend the tenure of six government ministers from the Fifth Republic, thereby effectively ignoring the civil society’s call for democratic values in governance, much damage was done to his reputation as the first democratically elected president. In addition, President Roh invited four university professors, all of whom did not have any prior experience in public administration, to his cabinet, deteriorating the overall efficiency and effectiveness of the bureaucracy. From the above, with inexperienced novices in leadership positions of government institutions, the Roh Administration revealed significant limitation in its governing capacity.

One of the defining characteristics of President Roh and his cabinet is a persistent overlap of policies and personnel appointments from the previous administration. Although the President actively promoted policies of administrative reform and anti-corruption drives, his guidance and directives could not get through his bureaucratic bodies.

Looking into the personal factors of the administration, one of the noticeable characteristics is an absence of reform-minded faction around the President. Lacking support from his inner circle, President Roh could not meet the citizens’ widespread expectation toward democratic reforms. While the Sixth Republic strived toward multiple reform-oriented agendas, most of the government’s initiatives were restricted within the administrative branch. In this sense, the Sixth Republic and its bureaucratic machine was an isolated island, deviating from the will of the populace. President Roh’s reform agendas (e.g., marketization, democratic consolidation, a complete implementation of regional decentralization, etc.) were far from complete, failing to transform the short-span attention of the constituents toward long-term dedication and support. Meanwhile, lacking tangible fruits of reform, most of the Sixth Republic’s initiatives and agendas ended up in the enlargement of size and scope of governmental institutions and agencies.

Cessation of Authoritarian Legacies: Political Democratization

Although President Kim’s electoral victory can be characterized as a result of strategic alliance with the governing party of President Roh, the very fact that Kim, a lifelong democratic activist, decided to merge his party with its governing counterpart highlighted that the termination of the rule of presidents with military backgrounds was the most urgent task facing Korean society. Looking into the election of 1992, it appears that Mr. Kim gained more popular support from the conservative electorates of the nation, which traditionally favored Korea’s past authoritarian regime. Although his victory was based on a political merger with the governing party of the Sixth Republic, President Kim attempted to conduct decisive reforms aimed at terminating the remnants of past authoritarianism throughout Korean society.

One of the biggest accomplishments of President Kim was ending the enduring legacy of the military’s intervention in politics. Upon inauguration, the President soon dissolved Hanahoe, an unofficial elite clique within the military, thereby effectively eliminating the military’s patron–client relationship with its civilian counterpart in the government. President Kim’s philosophy was concentrated on reforming the nation through cutting off ties from its authoritarian past: he held a firm belief that only through such radical turnover from the past could his administration gain credit and support from the populace. In this sense, President Kim had a deep understanding of political theories around the politicized military as the origin of evil on the third-world’s drive toward democracy.

Fighting corruption was one of his main agendas as well. He viewed corruption as by far the largest obstacle against Korea’s achievement of long-lasting economic prosperity. For instance, the enforcement of the Decree of the Act on Real Name Financial Transaction and Confidentiality was much more focused on eradicating corruption from the nation’s financial sector. In this sense, rather than a mere amalgamation of economic interests and pragmatic solution seeking, his reform-minded policies in the economic sector were indeed targeting the higher goal of overall reforms in the society. President Kim’s reform drives were not without objection: his insistence on reforming the financial sector was often a target of criticism within the inner circle, as the President’s cabinet frequently advised against such a rapid implementation of the measure.

Under President Kim, Korea succeeded in entering the coveted circle of the “First World” as it was officially invited to the Organization of Economic Cooperation of Developed Nations (OECD). This was a milestone in turning the tide of Korea’s overall economic policies, as the nation could not continue its former status as a “developing nation.” This meant that Korea’s manufacturing firms and its conglomerates could not expect the same degree of tax breaks and tariff protection from the government. Facing the so-called “Wave of Globalization” however, most of the firms in Korea were not fully ready to engage in full-scale competition with foreign corporations. In this sense, economic liberalization and full-scale opening of Korea’s financial market were perceived as threats to the homegrown firms in South Korea. For instance, as the government decided to open its financial markets, a sudden, large volume of foreign capital entered the system, while export-led manufacturing firms suffered trade imbalance. In 1996, Korea’s net trade imbalance was reaching the alarming rate of 23.7 billion USD, a two-fold increase from the year before. Foreign loans also skyrocketed, leading the nation to the verge of a massive financial crisis.

Although President Kim strived for Korea’s new international status as a fully democratized nation with developed economic prowess, he did not set clear-cut priorities between growth and redistribution, nor had any palpable coordination mechanism within his government. Lacking tangible content and sustainable support from within, President Kim’s “globalization” reform drive soon faltered. This is due to the fact that the Administration was aiming two different targets with the same arrow one for reforms in improving the quality of life (e.g., education, social welfare, labor and reforms) and the other for globalization (e.g., increased national competitiveness, deregulation, and economic liberalization).

New Public Management in Korea

As mentioned above, President Kim’s governing philosophy can be succinctly summarized as cessation of Korea’s authoritarian past. From a bureaucratic perspective, the Kim Administration’s defining moment occurred when the President ordered initiatives and guidelines based on enhancing transparency and efficiency of government apparatus, thereby effectively implanting the mechanisms of New Public Management.

First, President Kim’s drive toward transparency was a detailed effort, which was soon formulated in the actual policies of financial market reforms and revealing the data on the personal properties of high-level government officials. The very fact that President Kim’s reform policies were pragmatic measures aimed at tangible results was a deviation from his predecessor, as Korea’s past governments were reluctant in implementing their rhetoric toward enhancing transparency. This is ever more significant as President Kim’s emphasis on transparency had a deep, profound connection with the zeitgeist of consolidating the newborn democracy on Korean soil. President Kim started off his policy by opening the list and amount of his personal property to the people, and soon his inner circle followed suit. This is a remarkable achievement as such measures were not legally binding at first. Korea’s media and press also joined in by publishing articles and reports on hidden corruption scandals throughout the society.

Second, it was under President Kim’s five-year tenure as the school of New Public Management began its expansion throughout Korea’s bureaucratic apparatus. NPM can be roughly understood as bringing in management techniques of the private sector to public institutions. “Efficient but small government” was the motto of the NPM school, and President Kim had a firm understanding of the contemporary intellectual flow of public administration that had a great amount of emphasis on the globalization and professionalization of bureaucracy with information-centered organizational structures. In 1993, the first year of the Kim Presidency, the government eliminated two government branches and laid off 139 public employees. In 1994, total of 115 official positions were eliminated from the payroll, with an additional downsizing of 1002 personnel. Facing the wave of NPM-oriented reforms, the military was not an exception either, as the Ministry of National Defense, Joint Chiefs of Staff, and Military Headquarters endured significant downsizing.

From an NPM perspective, reforms concerning internal government regulations were also initiated. Regarding administrative regulations and civil complaint matters, a government ombudsman was established. The President initiated policies aimed at reducing unnecessary red tape throughout the public sector, while putting efforts (e.g., consumer protection, traffic accident management procedures, and modifying administrative penalties) on improving the actual quality of life of the populace.

Next, privatization of Korea’s state-owned enterprises soon followed. Within the inner circle of the top-echelon, President Kim and his advisers held a belief that private corporations are better suited to attain efficiency and effectiveness than public entities. Their preference of private firms over public institutions was soon developed into a policy through which government officials and public employees received one-point lectures and seminars from middle-upper level managers of Korea’s conglomerates. Most of the lectures and class materials were focused on advertising the success and initiatives of private firms, which obviously did not provide much help to the “students” from the government offices. This reveals that President Kim and his inner circle did not have a concrete understanding on the difference between public and private entities and the discrete environment on which each sector performs its given role. Although Kim’s government was consistently active in promoting reforms throughout both the public and private areas of the nation, their blueprint and philosophy on national agendas contained a significant degree of contradiction.

Looking into President Kim’s leadership on policy decision making, one can notice a significant distance from what a leader would do under the New Public Management school. President Kim repeatedly emphasized that he, and only himself, is the very first legitimate president of the Republic of Korea. His inner circle harbored moral righteousness and a sense of superiority. From the beginning of the Administration, President Kim and his advisers acted as if they were the sole representatives of justice, and that only they can bring substantial reforms to the Korean society. Their assertive attitudes engendered numerous practical problems as the President’s inner circle was a small minority when compared to the overall bureaucrats in the government system. President Kim’s leadership was sometimes overly assertive while insisting on his predecessor’s top-down approach in delivering guidance and initiatives. More often than not, he did not follow written procedures when deciding significant policy agendas, some of which even lacked rudimentary-level discussion with his advisers before getting announced. This shows that President Kim, specifically concerning his leadership style, was not a real disciple of the New Public Management school.

From the very beginning, Kim strived to appoint “new faces” to key cabinet positions, as he believed that shuffling out government officials from the previous era was essential to achieve democratic consolidation throughout the nation. Yet, what this meant is that most of the newly appointed ministers did not have much experience with how to manage the vast bodies of Korea’s administrative machine. Considering Kim’s past as a devoted democracy activist, most of his inner circle did not have systemic experience in governance. In this sense, it was far difficult for the Office of the President to effectively dominate the newborn administration. As the Blue House was filled with inexperienced politicians who had devoted most of their career in fighting against the past autocratic regimes, Kim’s inner circle became increasingly closed door, and ironically, started to resemble its authoritarian predecessors. In this sense, President Kim’s personnel administration over his key government posts was perceived as nothing more than a kitchen cabinet, which lacked systemic reviewing procedures and democratic deliberation over the appointment. Based on his closed, clandestine nature of personnel management style, President Kim often suffered from mockeries and criticisms from his opponents who frequently referred the Blue House as “reform-minded authoritarianism” and “nonmilitary autocracy.”