Conscience, Leadership and the Problem of ‘Dirty Hands’: Volume 13

In this paper we are revisiting the concept of a profession. Definitions of the concept are readily encountered in the literature on professions and we have collected a sample of such definitions. From these samples we distil frequently occurring elements and ask whether a synthesis of these elements adequately explains the concept. We find that bringing the most frequently occurring elements together does not adequately address the reason (or purpose) that society differentiates professions from other occupations or activities – why there is a concept of ‘profession’ at all. We suggest an alternative approach that attempts to make sense of the concept at a more general level. This, more philosophical, approach employs analytical tools from Julius Kovesi, Patricia Hanna and Bernard Harrison to address the question of what is the point of the concept.

We utilise the problem of dirty hands to consider the ethical dimensions of commissions of inquiry, particularly commissions of inquiry conducted for the purposes of public policy. The Independent Local Government Review Panel (ILGRP) in NSW is used as an example for the purposes of discussion. Four questions endemic to considerations of dirty hands are derived from Coady (2014). The framework affords various insights into the ethical terrain of this particular inquiry and those undertaken for the purposes of public policy more generally. We argue that commissions of this type and the ILGRP in particular cannot be labelled examples of dirty hands and that the concept of determinatio from the work of St Thomas Aquinas sheds light as to the nature of moral claims around commissions. We also argue that a fruitful analysis is afforded by Wallis’ (2013) analytic framework of the ‘logic of fateful choices faced by the leaders of commissions of inquiry’. Nevertheless, confusion surrounding the nature and types of inquiries is partially responsible for accusations of their ethical incoherence.

An influential strand of human rights theory explains human rights through appeal to their function. Such ‘function’ theories highlight the role human rights play in international practice and discourse as standards for appropriate state treatment of individuals. But standards in what sense? Standards to be promoted and encouraged through public critique, bilateral pressure, institutional censure or legal culpability? Or standards to be protected and defended through all necessary means? I argue that function theorists conflate (what states themselves recognize as) the important distinctions between these standards. Worse still, many function theorists argue that a major – even definitive – role of human rights involves demarcating permissibility conditions for humanitarian intervention. I argue that this claim gravely mischaracterizes international practice and discourse – in particular it fails to recognize the independent significance of other functional norms operating within the global context. The theorists correctly perceive that we have powerful reasons for wanting this role (of threshold conditions for military intervention) fulfilled, but by mistaking the norms that in fact fulfil it, they distort the actual function of human rights.

War is undoubtedly a dirty business, usually entailing massive destruction and loss of life on both sides. In an attempt to limit this inevitable death and destruction, philosophers have argued that belligerents must following certain principles in the conduct of warfare; namely, the principles of discrimination (that only legitimate military targets may be attacked) and of proportionality (that the damage done in attacking such targets must not be out of proportion to the military value of the target). These principles have come to be enshrined in International Law through a range of treaties, which are collectively known in military circles as the International Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC).

The essential idea at the heart of Michael Walzer’s supreme emergency argument, or as Brian Orend calls it, the supreme emergency exemption, is that desperate times call for desperate measures. If the situation is dire enough, and the consequences faced are serious enough, then it will be justifiable to act in ways which would normally be prohibited. In concrete terms, what this means is that during a time of war, a state can in some circumstances ignore the usual rules of warfare (i.e. the principles of discrimination and proportionality). Walzer claims this is justified if and only if the following conditions are met: the state is the victim of aggression, the state is about to be militarily defeated, and that the consequences of defeat will be catastrophic (i.e. would include extreme and widespread violations of fundamental human rights). In other words, when faced with a supreme emergency one is justified in engaging in widespread violations of the rights of some people (people to whom one only has a general duty) in order to prevent widespread violations of the rights of others (people to whom one has a specific duty).

In this paper I argue that the ‘rules’ which must be applied in order for widespread rights-violations to be considered justified are actually well understood, and that supreme emergency is not an unusual situation for which new rules must be considered, but simply an important specific example of such a situation. Essentially I argue that one must dirty one’s hands in war, but that there is no need for one’s hands to get any dirtier in a situation of supreme emergency.

This paper provides a novel framework for considering a much-debated question within military ethical fields, using insights from two of the major proponents of contemporary military ethics.

This paper compares two approaches to the moral justifications for killing in war: the forfeiture approach, which sees killing as justified when the victim has forfeited his or her right not to be killed, and the double-effect approach, which argues that even if intentional killing is absolutely prohibited, that killing can still be morally acceptable under certain conditions, most notably if it is not the intended, desired outcome of a person’s chosen action. The double-effect approach is considered out of fashion in contemporary military ethical literate. I argue that it warrants equal attention as an internally viable and coherent account of the morality of killing, and is preferable in at least one way: that it protects combatants from being necessarily culpable of killing merely by serving in active combat positions.

By defending an alternate framework to the forfeiture approach to killing which is most popular in today’s military ethical literature, I provide an opportunity for new and increased philosophical reflection and discourse on the ethics of killing, as well as new opportunity for defenders of double-effect to make a substantive contribution to the field. This paper demonstrates the internal consistency of arguments that seek to utilise DDE, including its relevance to individual self-defence and individual killing in war.

Given the multiplying and intensifying global systemic crises (ecological, financial, etc.), the question of revolution resurfaces. The paper addresses a crucial dimension of this question: the issue of revolutionary leadership. Two exemplary leaders are analysed: Jesus of Nazareth and Ernesto ‘Che’ Guevara. The key purpose of the analysis is to show how these ‘pure-hearted’ leaders were ‘paradoxically’ willing to employ ‘dirty hands’, which in this context denotes revolutionary violence. Consequently, while peaceful approaches to structural transformation are obviously preferable, revolutionary violence should remain an ethical option.

Key findings advanced by the article include: (i) confirmation of the reasonableness of remaining actively open to the option of an ethical revolutionary violence; (ii) recognition that revolutionary love involves a dimension of hate; and (iii) confirmation that Jesus was a political revolutionary.

The paper is innovative and valuable in several respects: (i) it dares to broach the question of revolution; (ii) it shows how ‘the ethical’ may be inclusive of ethical violence; (iii) it challenges mainstream perceptions of Jesus as strictly a religious/apolitical figure, recalling and foregrounding his radical political dimension.

The literature on friendship reveals particular tensions within the notion of friendship; tensions such as that between the significance of similarity by comparison with difference within the relationship; or the tension between liking a friend for his traits and qualities and liking him uniquely. The work of Jacques Derrida in The Politics of Friendship helps to elucidate the first of these tensions, beginning with an examination of the claim sometimes attributed to Aristotle: ‘O, my friends, there is no friend’ to argue that friendship as fraternity can become the schema that democracy adopts for the future. This paper explores and argues for the inter-relatedness of two questions about friendship in the context of politics: Can friendship act as a model for political community? And is friendship itself a political relationship? It argues that while both these questions can be answered in the affirmative, those answers create value by providing a guide that can support the development of our complex identities as mature individuals and citizens.

The purpose of this essay is to survey the ethical guidelines Red Cross personnel use to determine the appropriate course of action when faced with morally dilemmatic situations, such as whether or not to accept private donations to fund humanitarian operations.

A review of the principles which buttress and guide all Red Cross action is presented along with two case studies – one in which the Solomon Islands Red Cross Society refused money from a controversial mining company, which could have been used to assist flood victims, and the other in which the Nigerian Red Cross Society accepted money from oil companies that have been historically ethically-challenged – which illustrate the necessity of contextual analysis in making these decisions.

The principles upon which all Red Cross actions are based – humanity, impartiality, neutrality, independence – provide the guidelines by which to evaluate whether or not to accept private, corporate donations. The Red Cross principles-based ethics allows for seemingly contradictory decisions to be reached in different countries and contexts, but in manners which are ethically coherent and transparent.

This paper sets the foundation for future research into what guides humanitarian organizations as they carry out their life-sustaining operations. Organizations which use such ethical principles to determine the appropriateness of their actions should benefit from transparently demonstrating this.

Case studies from recent disasters demonstrate the value of using ethical guidelines to evaluate donor suitability. This rigor and transparency benefits not only the Red Cross and other humanitarian organizations, but most importantly those rendered vulnerable by disaster around the world.

This paper examines beliefs and attitudes in the context of how they influence the decisions of university Human Research Ethics Committees (HRECs) as a preface to undertaking an empirical study in this area. It also aims at establishing a conceptual framework to guide the design of a questionnaire targeting beliefs about research ethics and the implications of these beliefs on review practices of HREC members throughout Australia.

Using content analysis of the extant body of the literature the paper examines the relationship between the concepts of beliefs and knowledge, beliefs and attitudes, and among beliefs, attitudes and behaviour in the context of research ethics.

The discussion suggests that ethics approval practices can, at times, be influenced more by personal beliefs than by contemporary review standards. It is also suggested that personal beliefs can be transmitted through the review process and that HRECs can serve to influence the transfer of values from reviewers to researchers.

The framework that this paper presents has the potential to appraise an array of perspectives which in turn would guide the design of professional development programs. In addition, an improved, more nuanced understanding of how HREC members make ethical decisions will positively impact and inform best practice in the review of ethical applications for research projects.

The paper presents a novel theoretical framework underpinning research ethics reviewer beliefs and attitudes within a contemporary context.

Healthcare practitioners, according to legislations in most Western countries, may refuse to perform some medical activities that conflict with their moral and religious values. The Roman Catholic Church has declared in official documents that doctors should not perform or facilitate activities considered immoral such as abortion and euthanasia. The goal of this paper is to suggest new options for regulating conscientious objection of Roman Catholic healthcare practitioners.

In this paper, the possibility of a renewed ethics of the role of the physician is explored by appeal to the Hippocratic tradition. The Hippocratic Oath, in its many permutations, offers a unique historical example of a document that marks the boundary-crossing of the physician-in-training into the office of physician, properly speaking. In making the Oath, the physician or physician-in-training enters into a new maturity that develops out of his or her own subjective desires and constructs, through to an outlook that is bound to a transcendent ideal of both technical acumen in the chosen profession of the physician, but also in a zeal for that which is good or virtuous. In other words, the Hippocratic tradition focuses the maker of the Oath upon a moral good; both for the physician and also for the patient. It may be years of practice and reflection before the significance of the Oath is realised in any particular medical professional. The Hippocratic tradition calls physician and patient alike towards a higher, but also more realist sense of virtue – in its ordinary and everyday sense, and the manner in which the good may be perceived even in the messiest of life and death conundrums. In this sense, a Hippocratic ethics of the physician might be possible that shows how the notion of ‘dirty hands’ is misleading, but also promising, in terms of the ethical possibilities for renewed notion of the virtuous physician.

‘Quandary in Utopia’ is an idea and a reflection on reality. I will speak about the knowledge and experience gained from my time in federal parliament in dealing with the state of Indigenous affairs and the perilous slippery slope of constant rule-changing and its impacts upon Australia’s Indigenous peoples. I will also reflect on my own upbringing on an Aboriginal reserve, the eventual move to the city, and being informed by family and cultural experience.